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  INTRODUCTION   
 
A new kind of evidence is making its way to America’s 
courts. Social media posts and text messages are surfacing in 
trials across the country, and the cases so far represent just the 
tip of the technological iceberg.1 The potential enormity of the 
emerging evidentiary phenomenon is apparent in the changing 
habits of our own lives. Many of us, particularly those under 
thirty, constantly transmit observations and impressions 
through text messages and social media sites, no matter where 
we are and what we are (supposed to be) doing.2 As 
“smartphone” ownership expands and younger adults—who al-
ready average over 100 text messages per day—replace their 
less technologically savvy elders, this new reality will become 
even more pronounced.3 Our world is becoming digital. Our tri-
als must surely follow.4
 
†  Associate Professor, William & Mary Law School. I would like to 
thank Ed Cheng, George Fisher, Ed Imwinkelried, Fred Lederer, Aviva Oren-
stein, and David Sklansky for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
Fred Dingledy and Anna Gillespie provided valuable research assistance. 
Thanks most of all to Catherine Zoe Garrett. Copyright © 2013 by Jeffrey 
Bellin. 
 
[Editor’s Note: For further discussion of eHearsay, see Colin Miller, No 
Explanation Required? A Reply to Jeffrey Bellin’s eHearsay, 98 MINN. L. REV. 
HEADNOTES (forthcoming November 2013), http://www.minnesotalawreview 
.org/headnotes.] 
 1. See, e.g., infra notes 12–13 (identifying recent cases involving electron-
ic communication evidence). 
 2. See Aaron Smith, Americans and Text Messaging, PEW INTERNET & 
AM. LIFE PROJECT 2 (Sept. 19, 2011), http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/ 
Reports/2011/Americans%20and%20Text%20Messaging.pdf. 
 3. See id.; see also Maeve Duggan & Lee Rainie, Cell Phone Activities 
2012, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT 5 (Nov. 25, 2012), http:// 
pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2012/PIP_CellActivities_11.25.pdf (re-
porting survey results that show “[t]exting is nearly universal among young 
adults, ages 18–29” and “[t]he vast majority of cell phone owners send and re-
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The trial of Dharun Ravi, whose electronic snooping be-
came front-page news, may be a harbinger of things to come. 
Ravi’s trial revolved around “a pixelated paper trail” of “Twitter 
feeds, Facebook posts, text messages, e-mails and other online 
chatter,” including Ravi’s roommate’s chilling last Facebook 
status update: “Jumping off the gw bridge sorry.”5 Similar ex-
amples of electronic evidence appear in the news with regulari-
ty. In a span of a few weeks this past year: a Dallas woman 
sent out a series of tweets before her untimely death, stating 
that she had “a [s]talker” who had tried to kill her “3 times be-
fore,”6 a telephone repairman texted a friend to “CALL . . . AN 
AMBULANCE” since he had been “attacked wi[t]h a flat crow-
bar” and had his “head split open,”7
 
ceive text messages” with “the exception of mobile phone owners 65 and old-
er”); infra Part I.A (discussing statistics for text messaging and social media 
usage).  
 an American diplomat 
killed in a terrorist attack in Libya transmitted an online chat 
message shortly before his death, prophetically stating: 
“[A]ssuming we don’t die tonight. We saw one of our ‘police’ 
 4. See JOSHUA BRIONES & ANA TAGVORYAN, SOCIAL MEDIA AS EVIDENCE 
5 (2013) (“There is . . . little question that litigation will regularly involve so-
cial media data as evidence.”); Nicole D. Galli et al., Litigation Considerations 
Involving Social Media, 81 PA. B. ASS’N Q. 59, 59 (2010) (“Litigators today ig-
nore social media outlets at their peril: jurors, judges, witnesses, clients and 
opponents all use social media, and so too must the savvy litigator . . . .”); Scott 
R. Grubman & Robert H. Snyder, Web 2.0 Crashes Through the Courthouse 
Door: Legal and Ethical Issues Related to the Discoverability and Admissibility 
of Social Networking Evidence, 37 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 156, 203 
(2011) (“[G]iven the explosion of social networking usage, an attorney may be 
violating their ethical duty by failing to investigate the case fully by searching 
for relevant online information.”); Aviva Orenstein, Friends, Gangbangers, 
Custody Disputants, Lend Me Your Passwords, 31 MISS. C. L. REV. 185, 192 
(2012) (“Increasingly, evidentiary issues concerning the admission of social 
media arise in both civil and criminal cases.”). 
 5. David M. Halbfinger & Beth Kormanik, In Digital Record, Jurors Say, 
They Found Reasons to Convict, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2012, at A18. In the text 
message, “gw” refers to the George Washington Bridge in New York City. Id. 
 6. Scott Goldstein, In Final Tweets, Murdered Dallas Woman Said She 
Had Stalker, Received Death Threat, DALL. MORNING NEWS CRIME BLOG (Aug. 
21, 2012, 12:48 PM), http://crimeblog.dallasnews.com/2012/08/in-final-tweets 
-murdered-dallas-woman-said-she-had-stalker-received-death-threat.html (re-
porting final tweets of murdered woman that included the following: “Now 
Dude say He Gone KILL me. Wouldn’t be so bad if he ain’t tried 3 times be-
fore”). 
 7. Andy Campbell, AT&T Worker, Sends Haunting Texts Before Alleged 
Murder, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 26, 2012, 1:33 PM), http://www 
.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/26/kevin-mashburn-att-worker-texts-murder 
-bryan-middlemas_n_1916515.html. 
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that guard the compound taking pictures.”8 These examples are 
not anomalies; they represent an increasingly prevalent form of 
proof.9
Yet whether juries will, in fact, have access to the digital 
artifacts of litigated controversies remains an open question. 
Out-of-court statements offered to prove what they assert, even 
if uttered by a testifying witness, are “hearsay” in American 
courts and consequently admissible only through a hearsay ex-
ception.
 
10 Exceptions are legion, but each one is limited in 
scope.11 As a result, many electronic utterances—like out-of-
court statements generally—will fail to find any conduit for 
admissibility.12 Venerable hearsay exceptions will, of course, 
accommodate some electronic communications, but when they 
do it will be a product of happenstance, rather than foresight.13
 
 8. Matt Smith, Ex-SEALs, Online Gaming Maven Among Benghazi 
Dead, CNN.COM (Sept. 13, 2012, 8:53 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/13/us/ 
benghazi-victims. 
 
 9. See Grubman & Snyder, supra note 4, at 222 (“The explosive growth of 
social networking has already had an impact on the legal world, and the im-
portance of social networking evidence will only increase as a larger percent-
age of the population becomes active online.”). 
 10. FED. R. EVID. 801–04. 
 11. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803–04; Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 
298–99 (1973). 
 12. See CAL. LAW REVISION COMM’N, TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATION AND 
STUDY RELATING TO UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE: ARTICLE VIII: HEARSAY 
EVIDENCE 460 (1962) (“[M]uch, probably most, of what those now dead or oth-
erwise unavailable once said or wrote cannot be considered in court, however 
much a litigant may need to have it considered to establish his claim or his 
defense.”). For examples in the present context, see Versata Software Inc. v. 
Internet Brands, No. 2:08-CV-313-WCB, 2012 WL 2595275, at *1, *9 (E.D. 
Tex. July 5, 2012) (excluding an email documenting a meeting whose “sub-
stance . . . was an important issue during the trial,” while acknowledging that 
the analysis “may appear to have a hypertechnical flavor to it”); Gulley v. 
State, 2012 Ark. 368, at 7 (2012) (recounting trial court ruling excluding mur-
der victim’s texts to defendant as hearsay); cf. Witt v. Franklin Cnty. Bd. of 
Educ., No. CV-11-S-1031-NW, 2013 WL 832152, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 28, 2013) 
(noting that “Facebook messages” offered by plaintiffs in employment discrim-
ination lawsuit “are classic hearsay”). Commentators debate the real world 
impact of the hearsay prohibition. See, e.g., Eleanor Swift, The Hearsay Rule 
at Work: Has It Been Abolished De Facto by Judicial Decision?, 76 MINN. L. 
REV. 473, 504 (1992). There is evidence to support the view of most practition-
ers that courts take the hearsay rule seriously and routinely exclude evidence 
in response to its perceived dictates. Id. at 501, 504 (concluding based on sur-
vey of published federal court opinions that the hearsay “rule is not being abol-
ished de facto” and reporting results of survey of 169 prosecutors that show 
judges take the hearsay rule seriously); Sklansky, infra note 78, at 13 (noting 
that despite a proliferation of exceptions, “the rule still can show its teeth”). 
 13. See Grubman & Snyder, supra note 4, at 213–17 (discussing various 
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After all, the drafters of the evidence rules never contemplated 
digital communication.14
Fortunately, judicial manipulation of existing doctrine is 
not the only way to address the looming wave of electronic evi-
dence. Although they tend to ossify, evidence rules are not set 
in stone.
 Consequently, even if courts get the 
pertinent doctrinal analogies “right” (for example, is a search 
on “WebMD” analogous to an oral consultation with a family 
doctor?), there is no guarantee that those answers will sensibly 
separate electronic statements that should be admissible at tri-
al from those that should not. 
15 The rules can change, and in this context, the pro-
spects for change are real. The Advisory Committee on the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, charged with a “continuous study” 
of the rules in operation, has already signaled interest in the 
incipient academic debate regarding whether “the intersection 
of the evidence rules and emerging [communication] technolo-
gies” necessitates changes.16
 
hearsay exceptions that might apply to social media evidence). Most common-
ly, electronic utterances of a party will be admissible if offered by the opposing 
party. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2); see also, e.g., United States v. Harry, No. 
CR10-1915-JB, 2013 WL 684646, at *30 n.24 (D.N.M. Feb. 19, 2013) (denying 
motion to suppress text messages sent by defendant responding to questions 
from friends about what happened on night of alleged sexual assault and not-
ing that the messages constituted statements of a party). 
 Even without federal action, states 
 14. See Jeffrey Bellin, Facebook, Twitter, and the Uncertain Future of Pre-
sent Sense Impressions, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 331, 341–43 (2012) (exploring out-
dated assumptions of drafters of present sense impression hearsay exception). 
 15. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012) (procedure for amending rules); FED. R. 
EVID. 1102 (same). See generally Paul R. Rice & Neals-Erik William Delker, 
Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee: A Short History of Too Little 
Consequence, 191 F.R.D. 678, 686 (2000) (describing tenure of the Advisory 
Committee on the Rules of Evidence and criticizing the Committee’s relative 
inactivity in amending the rules). The Federal Rules of Evidence were recently 
revised solely to improve their style. See United States v. Darden, 688 F.3d 
382, 385 n.2 (8th Cir. 2012).  
 16. Meeting Minutes, Federal Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules 13 
(Oct. 5, 2012), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/ 
rules/Agenda%20Books/Evidence/EV2012-10.pdf (reporting that the members 
of the Committee “expressed strong support” for holding a “symposium in the 
[f]all of 2013 to consider the intersection of the evidence rules and emerging 
technologies” and citing Bellin, supra note 14, and Richter, infra note 65, for 
opposing views on the need for changes to federal hearsay rules); see Rice & 
Delker, supra note 15, at 686; COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PROCEDURES FOR THE CONDUCT 
OF BUSINESS BY THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEES ON RULES OF PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE (1998), reprinted in 181 F.R.D. 18, 162–67 (1998) (de-
scribing responsibilities of the Committee). 
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could take the lead by amending their own evidence rules, 
spurring other jurisdictions to follow suit.17
With respect to the form that change should take, electron-
ic hearsay presents a particularly appealing target for the fa-
miliar arguments in favor of easing the hearsay prohibition. 
Evidence rules exclude hearsay primarily because of fears of 
unreliability.
  
18 Statements broadcast on social media or via text 
messaging, however, are often quite reliable because they are 
(1) uttered while events are unfolding and so reflect partici-
pants’ perceptions prior to the distorting effects of litigation 
(and time), and (2) preserved in precisely the form in which 
they were uttered.19 If a proper framework for admitting such 
evidence over a hearsay objection can be constructed, juries 
could have access to a bounty of information that, more often 
than not, would advance the search for truth—a worthy goal.20
 
 17. Cf. Kathrine Minotti, The Advent of Digital Diaries: Implications of 
Social Networking Websites for the Legal Profession, 60 S.C. L. REV. 1057, 
1074 (2009) (“In a world where hundreds of millions of people are actively us-
ing social networking web sites, ignoring this evidence places an impediment 
on the search for truth. States should . . . be proactive in accommodating this 
innovative evidence outlet.”). 
 
Thus, changing communication practices present not just a 
challenge to existing legal doctrine, but also an opportunity. 
Scholars, judges, and policymakers can seize this “evidentiary 
 18. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973) (“The hearsay 
rule . . . is . . . grounded in the notion that untrustworthy evidence should not 
be presented to the triers of fact.”); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Need to Res-
urrect the Present Sense Impression Hearsay Exception: A Relapse in Hearsay 
Policy, 52 HOW. L.J. 319, 321–23 (2009) (chronicling hearsay dangers of “in-
sincerity” and “misrecollection,” with the former being the primary concern of 
the common law and the latter an increasing focus of modern commentary); 
Laurence H. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957, 958 (1974) 
(discussing “testimonial infirmities” of hearsay: “ambiguity, insincerity, faulty 
perception, and erroneous memory”). 
 19. See infra note 41 (describing the use of mobile devices to provide real-
time updates via social media outlets). 
 20. See infra Part I; cf. Michael Ariens, A Short History of Hearsay Re-
form, with Particular Reference to Hoffman v. Palmer, Eddie Morgan and Jer-
ry Frank, 28 IND. L. REV. 183, 187 (1995) (recognizing that rules of evidence 
are traditionally “based on the premise that the trier of fact (usually a jury) 
was to hear evidence which allowed it to determine what really happened”); 
Mike Redmayne, Rationality, Naturalism, and Evidence Law, 2003 MICH. ST. 
L. REV. 849, 849 (“Evidence rules have many functions, but one important 
function, and therefore target of evaluation, is making accurate judgments 
about the facts of cases.”); Jack B. Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 
IOWA L. REV. 331, 344–46 (1961) (summarizing scholarly criticism of hearsay 
rules based on their tendency to exclude evidence with significant probative 
value). 
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moment”21 to advance a long-stalled agenda: reducing the 
much-criticized overbreadth of the hearsay prohibition in 
American courts.22
To take advantage of the opportunity presented by the 
emergence of the new electronic communication norm, this Ar-
ticle proposes a concrete change to existing evidence law: a 
novel “eHearsay” exception. The exception is designed to pro-
vide factfinders with access to a large swath of electronic evi-
dence, while screening out the least reliable electronic state-
ments for continued exclusion.
 
23 The Article makes the case for 
the exception in four parts. Part I describes the changing com-
munication norm that invites revision of America’s evidence 
rules, and particularly its outdated hearsay framework. Part II 
discusses previous hearsay reform proposals that culminated in 
the “Statement of Recent Perception” (SRP) exception, an ex-
ception ultimately rejected by Congress in 1973.24
By adopting a hearsay exception like the one proposed 
here, judges and legislators would open the courts to terabytes 
 As Part III 
explains, the SRP exception provides an ideal framework for a 
new hearsay exception specifically tailored to the admission of 
reliable electronic utterances. Part III also fleshes out the pre-
cise contours of the proposed “eSRP” or “eHearsay” exception—
a variant of the original SRP exception updated for the digital 
era and fortified by a requirement that qualifying statements 
be “recorded.” Finally, Part IV discusses the implications of the 
new hearsay exception. 
 
 21. The quoted phrase borrows from the concept of “constitutional mo-
ments”—times when events outside the legal system set the stage for substan-
tial changes in the law. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Dis-
covering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1022 (1984). 
 22. For criticism of the American hearsay prohibition, see infra, Part II. 
See also Christopher B. Mueller, Post-Modern Hearsay Reform: The Im-
portance of Complexity, 76 MINN. L. REV. 367, 373–84 (1992) (summarizing 
criticism of hearsay rules and separating “modern” from “post-modern” cri-
tiques). Other major legal systems “manage well” without a hearsay prohibi-
tion. Weinstein, supra note 20, at 347 (discussing European legal systems, ar-
bitration, and administrative law tribunals); id. at 344–46 (criticizing hearsay 
prohibition while noting “surprising agreement” among scholars that the pro-
hibition sweeps too broadly). 
 23. The proposal builds on my previous work, which argues at a more mi-
cro level that existing evidence doctrine is ill-tailored to the admission (or ex-
clusion) of eHearsay. See Bellin, supra note 14, at 373 n.151 (raising the possi-
bility that a “new electronic-communication hearsay exception” could address 
changing communication norms). 
 24. See infra note 102 and accompanying text (explaining rejection of pro-
posed Rule 804(b)(2)). 
Bellin_MLR  
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of electronic evidence and, at the same time, considerably 
weaken the long-criticized American hearsay prohibition. The 
general principle behind the proposal is that more information 
leads to more truth.25 Evidence rules often push against this 
principle, but when they do, strong justifications are required.26
I.  THE NEW COMMUNICATION NORM   
 
This Article applies that straightforward sentiment to reach a 
controversial conclusion: changes in culture and technology 
have led to the creation of a vast, new subset of recorded out-of-
court statements that, while excluded by current evidence doc-
trine, cannot justifiably be kept from juries. 
The analysis begins with a description of the new electron-
ic communication norm. Any policy prescription for addressing 
this norm depends on an accurate understanding of what the 
norm entails. After describing the new norm, this Part explains 
why—contrary to the initial sentiments of the evidence com-
munity27
A. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE NEW NORM 
—its emergence necessitates changes in existing evi-
dence doctrine. 
A new age of electronic communication is dawning.28
 
 25. Cf. Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Prin-
ciples: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 922 (1995) (argu-
ing in a related context that “one can simultaneously reduce both false nega-
tives and false positives only by bringing more information into a system” and 
that “[o]ur current system throws out too much information”). 
 In-
stant messages, email, “status updates,” “tweets,” and text 
messages are steadily replacing water cooler gossip, handwrit-
 26. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403–11; Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996) 
(discussing evidentiary privileges, but emphasizing the general rule disfavor-
ing them because “the public . . . has a right to every man’s evidence” (quoting 
United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950))). 
 27. See infra note 65. 
 28. See ERIK QUALMAN, SOCIALNOMICS: HOW SOCIAL MEDIA TRANSFORMS 
THE WAY WE LIVE AND DO BUSINESS, at xxi (rev. ed. 2011) (“[W]e are in the 
early stages of . . . [a] far-reaching revolution [that is] being driven by people 
and enabled by social media.”); Wesley MacNeil Oliver, Western Union, the 
American Federation of Labor, Google, and the Changing Face of Privacy Ad-
vocates, 81 MISS. L.J. 971, 986 (2012) (recognizing societal movement “from 
telephones to cell phones, e-mails, texts, and instant messages” and a future 
where “text messaging replaces cell phone calls”). A similar description of the 
new communication norm and its potential to create admissible evidence ap-
pears in my recent articles. Jeffrey Bellin, Applying Crawford’s Confrontation 
Right in a Digital Age, 45 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 33, 35–37 (2012); Bellin, supra 
note 14, at 350–57. 
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ten letters, phone calls, and voicemail.29
The primary driver of the new communication norm is the 
ubiquity of handheld wireless devices capable of real-time elec-
tronic communication. Paul Ohm describes this development as 
“the rise of the ‘one device,’ the convergence of a person’s com-
puting needs into a single, portable, high-powered machine, 
equipped with an always-on, high-speed connection to the In-
ternet, and outfitted with dozens of sensors, including [camer-
as], a microphone, a GPS chip, and a digital compass.”
 The ascendance of elec-
tronic communication is propelled by two forces: the increasing 
prevalence of handheld wireless devices, and the astonishing 
popularity of “social media” Internet sites.  
30 For 
now, the most ubiquitous form of the “one device” is the cell 
phone. Once a novelty, cell phones have become the norm, but 
talking on the phone is increasingly passé. The vast majority 
(83%) of American adults own cell phones, and almost three-
quarters of them (73%) use their phones for “text messag-
ing”31—the practice of typing and transmitting short blocks of 
text directly to specified recipients. Most basically, texters 
communicate their plans, estimated arrivals, and unanticipat-
ed delays to friends, family, and acquaintances.32
 
 29. See Larry D. Rosen et al., The Relationship Between “Textisms” and 
Formal and Informal Writing Among Young Adults, 37 COMM. RES. 420, 421 
(2010) (discussing the prevalence of text messaging in American society); Katy 
Steinmetz, The Grid Is Winning, TIME, Aug. 27, 2012, at 41, 42 (explaining 
that in light of texting, phone calls are now “reserved for the most formal, fa-
miliar or time-sensitive communications”); Meghan Keane, Texting Overtakes 
Voice in Mobile Phone Usage, WIRED, Sept. 29, 2008, http://www.wired.com/ 
business/2008/09/texting-overtak (reporting on Nielsen survey that found that 
“by the end of the second quarter of [2008], an average mobile phone subscrib-
er placed or received 204 calls, compared with sending or receiving 357 text 
messages”). 
 More avid us-
 30. Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 
MISS. L.J. 1309, 1314–15 (2012); Nancy Gibbs, Your Life Is Fully Mobile, TIME 
Aug. 27, 2012, at 32 (“It is hard to think of any tool, any instrument, any ob-
ject in history with which so many developed so close a relationship so quickly 
as we have with our [mobile] phones . . . . A typical smart[]phone has more 
computing power than Apollo 11 when it landed a man on the moon.”). 
 31. Aaron Smith, Americans and Their Cell Phones, PEW INTERNET & AM. 
LIFE PROJECT 2 (Aug. 15, 2011), http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/ 
2011/Cell%20Phones%202011.pdf; see also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 
945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (citing June 2011 report that “there were 
more than 322 million wireless devices in use in the United States”); supra 
notes 28–29. 
 32. See Nenagh Kemp, Texting Versus Txtng: Reading and Writing Text 
Messages, and Links with Other Linguistic Skills, 2 WRITING SYS. RES. 53, 63 
(2010) (listing common texting abbreviations including “omw” for “on my 
way”); Leslie Seifert, A ‘Linguistic Renaissance’, NEWSDAY, June 22, 2008, at 
Bellin_MLR  
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ers keep up a near-constant dialogue with close friends and as-
sociates through rapid-fire text exchanges.33 Usage patterns 
track demographics. Adults who text send or receive “an aver-
age of 41.5 messages on a typical day, with the median user 
sending or receiving 10 texts daily.”34 Cell phone owners be-
tween the ages of 18 and 24 average 109.5 messages a day, an 
impressive work rate that adds up to more than 3200 texts a 
month.35 As more Americans purchase so-called smartphones—
gadgets of dazzling complexity that truly approximate Ohm’s 
“one device”—these averages will only increase. Smartphone 
users (including 45% of American adults and 66% of young 
adults) almost all send or receive text messages (92%); 59% use 
their smartphones to access social media sites.36
Social media sites like Facebook and Twitter constitute the 
second important driver of the new communication norm. The-
se sites form the indispensable infrastructure for mass elec-
tronic communication, providing easy access to large audiences 
of electronic “friends” or “followers” through home computers 
and mobile devices.
 
37
 
A57 (reprinting a text conversation between two fourteen-year-olds commiser-
ating about a recent test); infra notes 
 Social media sites rely on their users for 
content. Without a steady stream of posts, sites like Facebook 
and Twitter would be empty shells, so “they are constantly try-
ing to get more [content], inviting [users] to update, upload, 
135–36. 
 33. Amanda Lenhart, Teens, Smartphones and Texting, PEW INTERNET & 
AM. LIFE PROJECT 10 (Mar. 19, 2012), http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media/ 
Files/Reports/2012/PIP_Teens_Smartphones_and_Texting.pdf (“63% of all 
teens say they exchange text messages every day with people in their lives.”). 
 34. Aaron Smith, Americans and Text Messaging, PEW INTERNET & AM. 
LIFE PROJECT 2 (Sept. 19, 2011), http://pewinternet.org/Reports/~/media// 
Files/Reports/2011/Americans%20and%20Text%20Messaging.pdf [hereinafter 
Smith, Americans and Text Messaging]; cf. Ohm, supra note 30, at 1314–15 
(noting that text messaging “obsoleted the short phone call and passed note,” 
allowing “[s]tudents [to] gossip in class; spouses [to] trade grocery lists[,] and 
employers (and drug lords) [to] direct underlings”). 
 35. Smith, Americans and Text Messaging, supra note 34, at 2.  
 36. Lee Rainie, Two-Thirds of Young Adults and Those with Higher In-
come Are Smartphone Owners, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT 2 (Sept. 
11, 2012), http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2012/PIP_ 
Smartphones_Sept12%209%2010%2012.pdf (“45% of American adults own 
smartphones,” including 66% of those aged 18 to 29 and 59% of those aged 30 
to 49); see Investor Relations, FACEBOOK, http://investor.fb.com/releasedetail 
.cfm?ReleaseID=780093 (last visited Oct. 13, 2013) (“Mobile [monthly active 
users] were 819 million as of June 30, 2013.”); Smith, Americans and Text 
Messaging, supra note 34, at 3; cf. Gibbs, supra note 30, at 32 (“Three-quarters 
of 25-to-29-year-olds sleep with their phones.”). 
 37. See infra note 43. 
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post and publish.”38 Their efforts have been successful. Face-
book boasts more than 1 billion “active users.”39 Twitter reports 
a steadily increasing average of over 400 million daily tweets.40 
Both sites permit users to communicate their observations 24-
hours-a-day, either from a stationary computer or a mobile de-
vice.41 In the words of a New York judge ordering Twitter to 
comply with a prosecutor’s subpoena, these services have be-
come “a significant method of communication for millions of 
people across the world.”42
Facebook’s primary feature—the “status update”—keeps 
users updated on the latest happenings in their friends’ lives. 
The updates range from milestones (“We are celebrating Steve’s 
40th birthday today!”) to banalities (“Carey kept us up all 
night . . . again”). The Facebook audience typically comments 
on each update, and the poster responds, creating a mini-
conversation to supplement every post.
 
43
 
 38. See MATT IVESTER, LOL . . . OMG 17–18 (Serra Knight 2011) (“[T]he 
average Facebook user posts 90 pieces of content on the site every month.”). 
 Those not inclined to 
 39. NewsRoom, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/Key-Facts (last visited 
Oct. 13, 2013). 
 40. See Celebrating #Twitter7, TWITTER BLOGS (Mar. 21, 2013, 7:42 AM), 
http://blog.twitter.com/2013/03/celebrating-twitter7.html (announcing that 
Twitter has “well over 200 million active users creating over 400 million 
Tweets each day”). 
 41. Free software applications enable broadcast (and receipt) of tweets 
and status updates from smartphones or other variants of the “one device.” 
Facebook Mobile, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/mobile (last visited Oct. 
13, 2013) (offering a free download of the Facebook application for the iPhone 
and Android mobile devices); Wherever You Are, Twitter Brings You Closer, 
TWITTER, http://twitter.com/download (last visited Oct. 13, 2013) (showcasing 
the Twitter application available for download on several mobile devices); see 
also Virginia Heffernan, The Medium: Being There, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 10, 
2009, at 15 (reporting that the capability of mobile devices to access social 
networking sites “has made it more likely that when a pal—the Jägermeister-
besotted Sean, say—writes that he’s stumbling home, he is stumbling home, 
right then”). 
 42. People v. Harris, 945 N.Y.S.2d 505, 507 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012). 
 43. See NORA YOUNG, THE VIRTUAL SELF 24 (2012) (“[W]e increasingly 
engage [in] auto-reportage, a continual ticker tape registering of how and 
where you are, and what you’re doing.”); Kirsty Young, Social Ties, Social 
Networks and the Facebook Experience, 9 INT’L J. EMERGING TECH. & SOC’Y 
20, 24–26 (2011) (exploring adult Facebook use through surveys and reporting 
that users view the service as a free and easy way to communicate “with large 
numbers of people at one time”); Amanda Lenhart et al., Teens, Kindness and 
Cruelty on Social Network Sites, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT 22 (Nov. 
9, 2011), http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2011/PIP_Teens_ 
Kindness_Cruelty_SNS_Report_Nov_2011_FINAL_110711.pdf (reporting that 
among teens, “chatting and instant messaging, commenting on their friends’ 
posts, and posting their own status updates” are the most common activities 
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verbosity can express approval by “liking” the update, or even 
one of the subsequent comments. Twitter users post “tweets”—
140-character messages—to similar effect, with “retweets” as 
opposed to “likes” serving as the customary form of endorse-
ment.44 Among online adults,45 two-thirds (66%) use “social me-
dia platforms” like Facebook and Twitter, generating “open 
running diaries” of their lives.46
B. THE NEED FOR NEW LEGAL DOCTRINE  
 
The startling usage statistics described above understate 
the changes looming on the horizon. Skyrocketing usage rates 
among younger generations foreshadow a future where every-
body uses social media and everybody texts.47 Scholars in all 
manner of disciplines have begun to explore the implications of 
this new electronic communication norm.48
 
on social media sites); Aaron Smith, Why Americans Use Social Media, PEW 
INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT 2 (Nov. 14, 2011), http://pewinternet.org/ 
Reports/2011/Why-Americans-Use-Social-Media.aspx (reporting that adults 
primarily use social media platforms to maintain “connections with family 
members and friends (both new and old)”); Murthy, infra note 
 Changes in commu-
nication patterns have significant societal implications, includ-
ing possible consequences for social movements, journalism, 
44, at 780 (de-
scribing Facebook “status updates” as “short one- or two-line messages” that 
are often “trivially banal” but are “circulated as ‘news’” to “your group of 
‘friends’ on the site”). 
 44. See Dhiraj Murthy, Twitter: Microphone for the Masses?, 33 MEDIA, 
CULTURE & SOC’Y 779, 781 (2011) (describing how Twitter works). 
 45. Seventy-eight percent of adults use the Internet, at least occasionally. 
Lee Rainie, The Internet as a Diversion and Destination, PEW INTERNET & AM. 
LIFE PROJECT 6 (Dec. 2, 2011), http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2011/Internet-as 
-diversion/Report.aspx. 
 46. QUALMAN, supra note 28, at 4; see Smith, supra note 43, at 2.; see also 
Oliver, supra note 28, at 988 (“With Facebook and Twitter, Americans them-
selves have grown accustomed, not necessarily to government eavesdropping, 
but to broadcasting virtually every detail of their lives to anyone who cares to 
surf the web.”).  
 47. For example, while 95% of eighteen- to twenty-nine-year-olds with cell 
phones text, the number drops to 24% for those over sixty-four-years-old. 
Smith, Americans and Their Cell Phones, supra note 31, at 6; see Clare Wood 
et al., A Longitudinal Study of Children's Text Messaging and Literacy Devel-
opment, 102 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 431, 431 (2011) (“Text messaging and the use 
of mobile phones are part of the everyday lives of young people.”); Lenhart et 
al., supra note 43, at 15 (“Internet use is nearly universal among American 
teens . . . .”).  
 48. See sources cited infra note 49. Legal scholars have reacted to these 
and related technological changes in other areas, such as Fourth Amendment 
protections. See, e.g., Symposium, The Fourth Amendment: Views of the Fu-
ture, 81 MISS. L.J. 895 (2012) (featuring thirteen articles about how the 
Fourth Amendment should adapt to changes in technology).  
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elections, and the physical and mental development of a young-
er generation immersed in the digital medium.49 The implica-
tions for courts may be equally profound.50
The evidentiary treatment of electronic communications is 
critically important not just because these communications are 
suddenly ubiquitous, but also because they are well suited to 
use in litigation. Electronic communications are both unusually 
public and surprisingly durable, a combination that means they 
will be easy for litigators to track down. The oft-quoted state-
ment “privacy is dead . . . get over it” may be overheated, but it 
stems from a new and disconcerting online reality.
 
51 Electronic 
communication is inherently less private than the forms of 
communication it is replacing. Electronic utterances are often 
intentionally (and sometimes inadvertently) broadcast to large 
audiences. Even when this is not the case, these communica-
tions travel through and reside on computer servers and 
transmission hubs that belong to companies, such as Facebook 
and Verizon, that may not always be inclined (or able) to pro-
tect their customers’ privacy.52
 
 49. See NAOMI S. BARON, ALWAYS ON: LANGUAGE IN AN ONLINE AND MO-
BILE WORLD 4–7 (2008) (discussing scholars exploration of the implications of 
new communication norms); ALAN KIRBY, DIGIMODERNISM 58 (2009) (“[T]he 
digimodernist text is . . . really new, something genuinely never before seen 
. . . .”); Paula Devine & Katrina Lloyd, Internet Use and Psychological Well-
Being Among 10-Year-Old and 11-Year-Old Children, 18 CHILD CARE IN PRAC. 
5 (2012) (finding that data indicated that the use of social-networking sites 
and online games related to poorer psychological well-being among girls, but 
not boys); Gwenn S. O’Keeffe et al., The Impact of Social Media on Children, 
Adolescents, and Families, 127 PEDIATRICS 800 (2011) (exploring the dramatic 
increase in the use of social media sites by adolescents and preadolescents and 
discussing the implications of their use); William Lafi Youmans & Jillian C. 
York, Social Media and the Activist Toolkit: User Agreements, Corporate Inter-
ests, and the Information Infrastructure of Modern Social Movements, 62 J. 
COMM. 315, 316 (2012) (citations omitted) (noting that the debate surrounding 
the utility of social media in revolutions “pits advocates of the Internet’s 
emancipatory promise against . . . ‘slacktivism,’ or superficial, minimal effort 
in support of causes”). In August 2012 Time magazine published “The Wireless 
Issue”; the centerpiece of the issue was a series of ten articles that chronicled 
the “10 Ways Mobile Technology Is Changing Our World.” The Wireless Issue: 
10 Ways Mobile Technology Is Changing Our World, TIME, Aug. 27, 2012, 
http://content.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,20120827,00.html. 
 
 50. Grubman & Snyder, supra note 4, at 221–22 (emphasizing “the proba-
bility that social networking evidence will become an issue in a wide variety of 
litigation”). 
 51. David Ticoll, Transparency: It’s Here to Stay: Get Used to It, GLOBE & 
MAIL, Feb. 28, 2003, at C1, available at 2003 WLNR 14073422 (quoting Sun 
Microsystems CEO Scott McNealy). 
 52. See Ohm, supra note 30, at 1314–15; Junichi P. Semitsu, From Face-
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Electronic statements are not just exposed to larger audi-
ences. They are also preserved in a way that is distinct from 
most traditional forms of communication. As one commentator 
puts it, “[w]hat we do in the digital world often lasts forever.”53 
An oral assertion, such as a comment to a coworker about a su-
pervisor’s improper advances, will be difficult to remember 
with any precision months or years after its utterance, and 
even more difficult to bring before a jury in admissible form. In 
addition to problems of memory, production of such communi-
cations at trial depends on the cooperation of the relatively few 
persons who heard them. By contrast, electronic utterances 
rarely dissipate completely. Much to the chagrin of some 
speakers, an email, text, tweet, or status update can be uncov-
ered by savvy litigators reviewing electronic files long after its 
utterance.54
 
book to Mug Shot: How the Dearth of Social Networking Privacy Rights Revo-
lutionized Online Government Surveillance, 31 PACE L. REV. 291, 338–42 
(2011).  
 Memory is irrelevant. And so is cooperation. An 
 53. IVESTER, supra note 38, at 25; see QUALMAN, supra note 28, at 2–3 
(noting that unlike other types of communications whose contents will degrade 
over time and distance, with electronic communications, the “digital string is 
passed intact”); see also Paul Ohm, Probably Probable Cause: The Diminishing 
Importance of Justification Standards, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1514, 1556 (2010) 
(explaining that a key distinction between a “Facebook status update” and the 
casual utterances these status updates replace is that, unlike the stray “utter-
ances that once floated through the air and then disappeared without a trace,” 
status updates are “not only . . . stored, but also they are accessible by a com-
pany that is not a party to the conversations”); Ohm, supra note 30, at 1315 
(noting that text messaging “listens more and stores more than [the types of 
communications] it has replaced”); Get To Know Twitter: New User FAQ, 
TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/groups/31-twitter-basics/topics/104 
-welcome-to-twitter-support/articles/13920-get-to-know-twitter-new-user-faq# 
(last visited Oct. 13, 2013) (“We store all your Tweets. You can . . . view up to 
3200 of your most recent Tweets in your profile timeline.”). 
 54. See Seth P. Berman et al., Web 2.0: What’s Evidence Between 
“Friends”?, 53 BOS. B.J. 5, 6 (2009) (advising litigators that they can obtain 
discoverable Facebook postings either from the computers of participants in 
the conversation or “from Facebook itself”); Ohm, supra note 30, at 1314–15 
(explaining that communicating messages on social media and via text mes-
saging “store[s] copies of what is said on each endpoint and on network servers 
in the middle, too”); Daniel de Vise, Schoolyard Face-Offs Blamed on Facebook 
Taunts, WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 2008, at C1 (noting that Facebook comments are 
“immortalized on semi-public Web pages, where they can be viewed by thou-
sands”); Tiffany Kary, Twitter Turns Over Wall Street Protester Posts Under 
Seal, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Sept. 14, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
2012-09-14/twitter-turns-over-wall-street-protester-posts-under-seal.html (ex-
plaining, in the context of the subpoena of the suspect’s Twitter account, that 
“Twitter . . . keeps as many as 3,200 posts” of its users); Jacob Leibenluft, Do 
Text Messages Live Forever?, SLATE (May 1, 2008), http://www.slate.com/ 
articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2008/05/do_text_messages_live_forever 
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electronic statement, unlike an oral analogue, can be presented 
to a jury with little (if any) assistance from a fact witness. A 
party merely needs to display the original electronic message at 
trial and can, if necessary, rely on a representative from T-
Mobile or Facebook to lay the requisite foundation for its ad-
mission.55
Attorneys and investigators are just beginning to explore 
the numerous options for obtaining relevant out-of-court elec-
tronic utterances. Most obviously, they can discover this type of 
evidence by searching public online forums (like Twitter) or by 
happenstance when illicit actors inadvertently broadcast in-
criminating information to interested parties, such as police.
 
56
 
.html (discussing the possibility of recovering deleted text messages, but also 
noting that some providers delete messages fairly rapidly); Biz Stone, Tweet 
Preservation, TWITTER BLOG (Apr. 14, 2010), http://blog.twitter.com/2010/04/ 
tweet-preservation.html (announcing Twitter’s agreement to “donate access to 
the entire archive of public Tweets to the Library of Congress for preservation 
and research”). 
 
Investigators can also locate relevant text messages and social 
 55. The message will need to be authenticated to be admissible, but can 
be authenticated (if necessary) through the service provider’s records. See 
United States v. Blackett, No. 11-1556, 2012 WL 1925540 (3d Cir. May 29, 
2012), mandamus denied, No. 13-2544, 2013 WL 4517154 (3d Cir. Aug. 27, 
2013) (noting the prosecution’s presentment of a text message through the 
custodian of records from Sprint); Gulley v. State, 2012 Ark. 368, at 12–15 
(2012) (rejecting the challenge to the authentication of text messages intro-
duced through testimony of a Verizon employee); Symonette v. State, 100 So. 
3d 180, 183 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (rejecting the authentication challenge 
to the photographs of text messages saved on the defendant’s phone); United 
States v. Kilpatrick, No. 10-20403, 2012 WL 3236727, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 7, 
2012) (holding authenticity of pager messages sent by defendant and alleged 
co-conspirators was established through representative of SkyTel); State v. 
Blake, 974 N.E.2d 730, 741–42 (Ohio Ct. App.), appeal denied, 133 Ohio St. 3d 
1490 (Nov. 28, 2012) (holding text messages were authenticated by a Cincin-
nati Bell representative). Attorneys will also need to navigate the lenient, but 
often misapplied, “best evidence” rule. See FED. R. EVID. 1001–04. 
 56. E.g., Errant Text Message Lands Suspected SM Drug Dealers in Jail, 
SANTA MARIA TIMES (May 30, 2012), http://santamariatimes.com/news/local/ 
errant-text-message-lands-suspected-sm-drug-dealers-injail/article_261a7a04 
-aa86-11e1-88c0-001a4bcf887a.html; Greg Leuthen, Errant Text Message 
Lands Missouri Woman in Jail on Drug Charges, KSPR NEWS (Sept. 1, 2011), 
http://articles.kspr.com/2011-09-01/jail-on-drug-charges_30103988; Jamie 
Lynn, Errant Text Message Leads to Arrest of a Wanted Man, KOMONEWS.COM 
(Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.komonews.com/news/local/Errant-text-message 
-leads-to-the-arrest-of-a-wanted-man-144534555.html; Mary Beth Quirk, Ask-
ing a State Trooper for Illegal Alcohol by Text Message Won’t Work Out Well, 
CONSUMERIST (May 17, 2012), http://consumerist.com/2012/05/asking-a-state 
-trooper-for-illegal-alcohol-by-text-message-wont-work-out-well.html; cf. 
Barnes v. Zaccari, 669 F.3d 1295, 1299 (11th Cir. 2012) (noting that a college 
president “was monitoring [the] Facebook webpage” of a student activist). 
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media posts saved on suspects’ and victims’ mobile electronic 
devices or on smartphones and computers left at a crime sce-
ne.57 For more enterprising investigators, social media sites 
provide new avenues for surreptitious evidence-gathering. New 
York City’s undercover officers seem particularly adept at 
“friending” members of criminal gangs on Facebook and obtain-
ing access to their online conversations.58 Informants use Face-
book too and, like undercover officers, can provide access to 
their associates’ postings—free of Fourth Amendment scruti-
ny—under the aptly named “false friends” doctrine.59 To uncov-
er communications by more discrete consumers of the electronic 
medium, authorities can obtain a subpoena or search warrant 
to compel third-party service providers such as Facebook and 
Verizon to disclose the contents of their customers’ accounts.60
 
 57. See Symonette, 100 So. 3d at 183 (noting the prosecution’s introduc-
tion of text messages recovered from defendant’s phone); State v. James, 288 
P.3d 504, 514–15 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012) (upholding an officer’s warrantless in-
spection of a cell phone as a search incident to arrest and rejecting hearsay 
challenges to admission of text messages obtained from phone); Adam M. 
Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, 56 UCLA L. REV. 27 
(2008). 
 
 58. Jose Martinez, Cop Tracked Brooklyn Gang Brower Boys by 
‘Friending’ Them Online, N.Y. POST, May 31, 2012, http://www.nypost.com/p/ 
news/local/brooklyn/facebook_em_gang_busted_5ZTTJeeMG2U5BJVztT4CjN; 
Aman Ali, Gang Members Arrested After Boasting of Murders on Facebook, 
REUTERS (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/19/us-crime 
-gang-socialmedia-idUSTRE80I2CI20120119 (recounting the murder arrests 
supported by evidence that the arrested “gang members, ages 15 to 21, 
bragged about the shootings on the social media sites Twitter, Facebook and 
YouTube”); see also Bill Archer, ‘Like’ Button Leads to Obstruction of Justice 
Charge, BLUEFIELD DAILY TELEGRAPH, Sept. 14, 2012, http://bdtonline.com/ 
local/x2056647583/-Like-button-leads-to-obstruction-of-justice-charge/print 
(chronicling how police located a fugitive through information obtained after 
his girlfriend “liked” the police department’s Facebook page); cf. Grubman & 
Snyder, supra note 4, at 205–06 (summarizing the developing legal re-
strictions on such tactics).  
 59. United States v. Meregildo, 883 F. Supp. 2d 523, 525–26 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012) (denying motion to suppress Facebook evidence obtained by police 
through cooperating witness who was the defendant’s Facebook “friend”). See 
generally On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 757–58 (1952) (holding that 
the “use of informers, accessories, accomplices, [and] false friends” to obtain 
information about suspects does not implicate the Fourth Amendment). 
 60. See Meregildo, 883 F. Supp. 2d at 525 (noting the issuance of a war-
rant for defendant’s Facebook account); Gulley, 2012 Ark. 368, at 3–4 (reject-
ing the challenge to the prosecutor’s obtaining of defendant’s text messages 
through a subpoena to Verizon and the admission of the texts through testi-
mony of a Verizon employee); Brief of Appellant at 9, Blackett, 2012 WL 
1925540 (No. 11-1556), 2011 WL 6935515, at *9 (noting that the text message 
introduced against defendant was “introduced into evidence by the custodian 
of records for the service company—Sprint”); BRIONES & TAGVORYAN, supra 
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In fact, despite often (understandably) breathless media 
coverage to the contrary, there is nothing legally noteworthy 
about obtaining private communications from social media sites 
or cellphone service providers.61 If relevant information exists, 
the government is entitled to use judicial process to obtain it—
as are private litigants—whether the information is held by a 
private citizen, Citizens & Southern National Bank, or Face-
book.62 The only thing that is changing is that investigators are 
starting to realize the breathtaking evidentiary potential of 
these electronic sources. Facebook quietly maintains a website 
(the “Law Enforcement Online Requests System”) for “law en-
forcement officials seeking records from Facebook” and pro-
vides alternative links for “private party requests, including 
requests from civil litigants and criminal defendants.”63
 
note 
 With 
4, at 35–38; Semitsu, supra note 52, at 360; Jeffrey Bellin, Finding Evi-
dence on Facebook, EVIDENCEPROF BLOG (Nov. 1, 2011), http://lawprofessors 
.typepad.com/evidenceprof/2011/11/finding-evidence-on-facebook.html.  
 61. See People v. Harris, 945 N.Y.S.2d 505, 513 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012); 
Wendy Ruderman, Court Prompts Twitter to Give Data to Police in Threat 
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2012, at A14 (reporting on Twitter’s compliance with 
court order to provide subscriber information); Joseph Ax, Twitter Surrenders 
Occupy Protester’s Tweets, REUTERS (Sept. 14, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2012/09/14/twitter-occupy-idUSL1E8KE6QN20120914. 
 62. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 401 (1976) (rejecting the 
argument that the Fifth Amendment “serve[s] as a general protector of priva-
cy”); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437–38 (1976) (holding that the en-
forcement of a government subpoena directed to the depositor’s records did not 
violate the depositor’s Fourth Amendment rights); United States v. Nixon, 418 
U.S. 683, 709–10 (1974) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(endorsing “ancient” maxim that where no privilege applies, “the public . . . 
has a right to every man’s evidence”); Juror No. One v. Superior Court, 142 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 151, 161–62 (Ct. App. 2012) (upholding courts’s authority to sub-
poena juror’s Facebook posts); Grubman & Snyder, supra note 4, at 189–97 
(summarizing the application of the discovery rules to social media evidence). 
 63. Information for Law Enforcement Authorities, FACEBOOK, https://www 
.facebook.com/safety/groups/law/guidelines (last visited Oct. 17, 2013); see also 
Jeff John Roberts, A New U.S. Law-Enforcement Tool: Facebook Searches, 
REUTERS (July 12, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/12/us 
-facebook-idUSTRE76B49420110712 (reporting that “U.S. law-enforcement 
agencies are increasingly obtaining warrants to search Facebook, often gain-
ing detailed access to users' accounts without their knowledge”); Law En-
forcement & Third-Party Matters: How Does Facebook Work with Law En-
forcement?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/473784375984502 (last 
visited Oct. 13, 2013) (“We may disclose information pursuant to subpoenas, 
court orders, or other requests (including criminal and civil matters) if we 
have a good faith belief that the response is required by law.”); Transparency 
Report, TWITTER, https://transparency.twitter.com/information-requests/2012/ 
jul-dec (last visited Oct. 13, 2013) (reporting the receipt of 815 domestic law 
enforcement requests for user information in last six months of 2012, and 
compliance with 69% of the requests). 
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respect to cell phones, law enforcement agencies already rou-
tinely obtain location information for subscribers’ mobile devic-
es, and experts believe the “next surge in surveillance is text 
messaging.”64
Given the bounty of discoverable electronic evidence gener-
ated by the new communication norm and the potential for 
much of this evidence to constitute a compelling form of proof, 
the obvious evidentiary question becomes how to funnel these 
communications to fact-finders. The doctrinal status quo is, of 
course, one option, and seemingly the preferred option for the 
few commentators who have weighed in so far.
 
65
At an intuitive level, it is clear that evidence doctrine, and 
specifically the rules governing the admissibility of out-of-court 
statements, should change in response to changing communica-
 But it is not at 
all clear how evidence rules designed for an era of oral commu-
nication, water-cooler gossip, quill, and parchment will apply in 
a new world of digital communication—and there is little rea-
son to think that we will like the results. 
 
 64. Massimo Calabresi, The Phone Knows All, TIME, Aug. 27, 2012, at 30–
31 (quoting chief of detectives in Rockland County, New York saying that 
“[t]here is a mobile device connected to every crime scene” and reporting the 
belief of “industry experts” that “the next surge in [law enforcement] surveil-
lance is text messaging”); see John P. Mello Jr., DEA Can't Get Around 
iMessage Encryption Roadblocks, MACNEWSWORLD (Apr. 5, 2013), http://www 
.macnewsworld.com/story/77717.html (describing the complaints of the Drug 
Enforcement Agency regarding its inability, despite court order, to obtain text 
messages sent through a specific texting application). 
 65. See Susan W. Brenner, Communications, Technology, and Present 
Sense Impressions, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 255, 261 (2011) (asserting 
that “we will have little difficulty adapting the [present sense impression] ex-
ception so that it can accommodate our use of social networking and whatever 
communication technologies evolve in the future”); Orenstein, supra note 4, at 
221 (arguing that the “byzantine hearsay structure works well” in adapting to 
social media communication, with the possible exception of the present sense 
impression exception); Liesa L. Richter, Don’t Just Do Something!: E-Hearsay, 
the Present Sense Impression, and the Case for Caution in the Rulemaking 
Process, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1657, 1661 (2012) (contending that the “[e]xisting 
hearsay doctrine was designed to deal with human communication . . . in 
whatever form it may take” and the “creation and preservation of hearsay in 
electronic form, therefore, provides no basis for charging in to refashion time-
honored hearsay principles”); Megan Uncel, Comment, “Facebook Is Now 
Friends with the Court”: Current Federal Rules and Social Media Evidence, 52 
JURIMETRICS J. 43, 56 (2011) (arguing that “social media evidence can be pre-
sented within the current Federal Rules of Evidence and new rules are unnec-
essary”); Randy Wilson, Admissibility of Web-Based Data, 52 THE ADVOCATE 
31, 31 (2010) (“At first blush, the decades-old evidence rules would seem ill-
suited for the task of establishing admissibility of electronic evidence. Yet, 
these rules have proven to be surprisingly flexible . . . .”). 
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tion norms.66 After all, the hearsay rules, and particularly the 
hearsay exceptions, identify subsets of out-of-court statements 
that are sufficiently reliable to be admissible without contem-
poraneous cross-examination. Assumptions about the way peo-
ple communicate drive this process.67
Viewed from the perspective of individual hearsay excep-
tions, the dilemma comes into sharp relief. Courts and litigants 
are already facing difficult questions as the dusty hearsay rules 
clash with digital communication, and many more are on the 
horizon:  
 If the assumptions 
change—as they must when communication norms change—
reliability assessments change as well. A set of rules that arose 
at a time when people communicated in a completely different 
manner (i.e., in person, by letter, and through landline phones) 
is unlikely to account for the dangers or benefits of out-of-court 
statements communicated on social media sites, in Internet 
chat rooms, and via text messaging. 
• Do CAPITALIZED text messages constitute “excit-
ed utterances”?68
• Are status updates “present sense impressions”?
 
69
 
 66. See Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 18 F.2d 934, 
937 (2d Cir. 1927) (Learned Hand, J.) (decrying as “especially disastrous” the 
“sluggishness of the law” in creating a business records hearsay exception in 
response to the changing “routine of modern affairs”); UNIF. R. EVID. 1 (1999), 
(recognizing that “[s]ocietal changes, advances in . . . science and improve-
ments in information technology have exposed many problematic evidentiary 
situations routinely faced by lawyers and judges” and an “increasing” trend 
where existing “rules fail to fit into a new environment, or alternatively, if 
they fit, they produce measurable inequity”); Judson Falknor, The Hearsay 
Rule and Its Exceptions, 2 UCLA L. REV. 43, 44 (1954) (quoting Professor 
Charles T. McCormick’s view that as exceptions to the hearsay rule “seemed 
most needed in the first half of the eighteen hundreds” including an exception 
for “book entries,” they “crystallized into exceptions to the hearsay rule”). 
 
 67. See, e.g., Bellin, supra note 14, at 333 (explaining how assumptions of 
an oral communication norm drove adoption of the present sense impression 
exception); cf. Orenstein, supra note 4, at 198 (highlighting the present sense 
impression exception as one example where rules might require change). 
 68. See FED. R. EVID. 803(2) (recognizing a hearsay exception for “excited 
utterances”); see also Campbell, supra note 7 (chronicling text messages sent 
by assault victim, who subsequently died of injuries, that included the text: “‘I 
NEED[] YOU TO CALL ME AN AMBULANCE[;]I HAVE BEEN ATTACKED” 
and recounted details of the assault); Gregory Connolly, York Call Center 
Among First in Nation to Offer Text-to-911 Service, WILLIAMSBURG YORKTOWN 
DAILY, Dec. 11, 2012, http://wydaily.com/2012/12/11/york-call-center-among 
-first-in-nation-to-offer-text-to-911-service (reporting adoption of technology 
that permits people to text 911 for emergency response). 
 69. FED. R. EVID. 803(1) (recognizing a hearsay exception for “present 
sense impressions”); see e.g., Bellin, supra note 14. 
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• Can WebMD searches be “statements made for 
medical diagnosis”?70
• Do routine work-related emails qualify as “business 
records”?
  
71
• Does a “retweet” or “like” constitute an “adoptive 
admission”?
  
72
The only honest answers to these and the host of related 
questions are: “maybe,” “sometimes,” or, perhaps most candid-
ly, “we’ll see.” This uncertainty is itself a concern in a world 
where most cases are resolved prior to trial by guilty plea or 
settlement.
 
73 Ex ante clarity as to the admissibility of evidence 
is critical in such a system, whose legitimacy depends on the 
idea that litigants can accurately forecast trial outcomes, and 
thus conform pretrial settlement to those forecasts.74
 
 70. FED. R. EVID. 803(4) (recognizing a hearsay exception for certain 
“statements made for medical diagnosis”); id. at 803(3) (hearsay exception for 
certain statements of emotional, sensory, or physical conditions). 
 Accuracy, 
not certainty, however, could be the primary casualty of doctri-
 71. FED. R. EVID. 803(6)(B) (recognizing a hearsay exception for records 
“kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of a business”); see, e.g., 
Abdelrahim v. Guardsmark, No. B207270, 2009 WL 3823283, at *3 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2009) (rejecting hearsay challenge to email detailing alleged cause for 
termination on the ground that email fell within the business records excep-
tion because the author regularly wrote emails as part of her job). 
 72. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B) (recognizing a hearsay exception for state-
ments against an opposing party where that party adopted the statement); see, 
e.g., Molly D. McPartland, An Analysis of Facebook “Likes” and Other Nonver-
bal Internet Communication Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, IOWA L. 
REV. (forthcoming November 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2256936 (supporting the view that Facebook likes 
should be considered adoptive admissions and excluded from hearsay objec-
tions); Allison L. Pannozzo, Uploading Guilt: Adding a Virtual Records Excep-
tion to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1695, 1706 (2012) (col-
lecting cases discussing whether forwarding email constitutes an adoptive 
admission and noting analogy to Facebook “liking”).  
 73. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1402, 1407 (2012) (citing De-
partment of Justice calculations for the proposition that “[n]inety-seven per-
cent of federal convictions and 94 percent of state convictions are the result of 
guilty pleas” and echoing commentators’ contention that “plea bargaining is 
. . . not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice 
system”); Thomas H. Cohen & Lynn Langton, Civil Bench and Jury Trials in 
State Courts, 2005, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. 1 (Apr. 9, 2009), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj 
.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=554 (reporting survey result of state courts 
that “trials . . . accounted for about 3% of all tort, contract, and real property 
dispositions in general jurisdiction courts”). 
 74. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2465 (2004) (discussing literature that largely justi-
fies a system of plea bargains and settlements on the basis of a “shadow-of-
trial” model). 
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nal inertia. Forcing courts to apply an outdated hearsay 
framework to a new form of evidence will inevitably keep relia-
ble out-of-court utterances from juries, decreasing the accuracy 
of their verdicts. At the same time, courts will be tempted to 
contort existing evidence rules either to admit reliable electron-
ic utterances that do not fit traditional hearsay exceptions, or 
exclude unreliable electronic utterances that do. Errors involv-
ing the admission or exclusion of electronic utterances are al-
ready common; many of the examples discussed below in this 
Article are drawn from cases where trial courts sensibly, but 
erroneously, admitted electronic utterances over a hearsay ob-
jection, and appellate courts—reluctant to get in the way of 
good evidence—deemed the error “harmless.”75
A final consideration is that courts cannot fully control ju-
rors’ access to publicly available online information, like posts 
on Twitter and (to some degree) Facebook. Individual jurors—
able to access these sites on their smartphones—will be tempt-
ed to fill obvious evidentiary gaps through their own online 
sleuthing.
 This is likely the 
real status quo; increasing slippage between what the evidence 
rules allow and what (some) courts admit, as the rules fail to 
track individual judges’ views of what constitutes reliable elec-
tronic evidence. 
76
 
 75. See, e.g., United States v. Blackett, 481 F. App’x 741, 742 (3d Cir. 
2012) (deeming apparently erroneous admission of text message “harmless”); 
People v. Logan, No. 303269, 2012 WL 3194222, at *6 (Mich. App. 2012) (rul-
ing that the “text messages [admitted at trial] were hearsay to which no ex-
ception applied,” but deeming their admission harmless error); Funches v. 
State, No. 57654, 2012 WL 436635, at *1 (Nev. 2012) (agreeing that a text 
message implicating defendant should not have been admitted, but declaring 
it “harmless” as defendant admitted the truth of the information on his own); 
cases cited infra note 
 A system that refuses to allow electronic evidence 
177; cf. Commonwealth v. Koch, 615 Pa. 612, 44 A.3d 
1147 (2012), rev’g 39 A.3d 996, 1002, 1006 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011) (holding that 
trial court erred in admitting text messages sent from the defendant’s phone 
and granting a new trial); Jonathan L. Moore, Time for an Upgrade: Amend-
ing the Federal Rules of Evidence to Address the Challenges of Electronically 
Stored Information in Civil Litigation, 50 JURIMETRICS J. 147, 176 (2010) 
(“[T]he flexibility of the rules to adapt and address the challenges of [electroni-
cally stored information] does not necessarily mean that amendments are not 
needed. . . . [S]ome of the changes wrought by technology have no common law 
analog, making it difficult for judges to resolve them.”). 
 76. See Amy J. St. Eve & Michael A. Zuckerman, Ensuring an Impartial 
Jury in the Age of Social Media, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, 8–17 (2012) (re-
counting examples of social media use during trials); John Schwartz, As Ju-
rors Turn to Web, Mistrials Are Popping Up, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2009, http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2009/03/18/us/18juries.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (“The 
use of BlackBerrys and iPhones by jurors gathering and sending out infor-
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through the front door may find it filtering into the jury room 
through other portals. 
In sum, leaving the courts to apply existing evidence doc-
trine to digital communication is an option, but it comes at a 
cost. Litigants will face uncertainty as to the admissibility of 
their electronic evidence; judges will be tempted to fill the void 
between the rules and intuition by distorting doctrine; jurors 
may seek online what they do not receive in court; and reliable 
evidence will be kept from juries. Given this reality, policymak-
ers, judges, and evidence scholars should, at a minimum, ex-
plore alternative approaches, particularly when the status quo 
takes the form of an antiquated hearsay framework that has 
long been crying out for reform. 
II.  REFORMING THE HEARSAY RULES   
As the previous Part suggests, the greatest obstacle to any 
effort to introduce online chatter, social media posts, email, and 
text messages into evidence at trial is the venerable hearsay 
prohibition.77 The now-codified prohibition, with its many dis-
crete exceptions, is the most distinctive feature of American ev-
idence law.78 It is also the most controversial.79
 
mation about cases is wreaking havoc on trials around the country. . . .”); Bri-
an Grow, As Jurors Go Online, U.S. Trials Go off Track, REUTERS (Dec 8, 
2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/08/us-internet-jurors-idUSTRE6 
B74Z820101208 (reporting that despite warnings, jury members continue to 
search for case information online through search engines and social media, 
and there has even been at least one instance of a jury member contacting a 
defendant through MySpace); cf. Juror No. One v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 151, 151 (Ct. App. 2012) (proceeding for juror misconduct after juror 
posted Facebook status updates regarding day-to-day events of trial). In an 
informal survey, jurors self-reported some temptation to do Internet research 
during trial, but claimed not to have succumbed. Eve & Zuckerman, supra, at 
21–23. 
 While evidence 
 77. Another obstacle is authentication, but authentication is likely to fade 
as a unique difficulty for admitting electronic communication as judges and 
litigants become familiar with the technology involved. See FED. R. EVID. 
901(a); Orenstein, supra note 4, at 222 (commenting that like written docu-
ments, electronic documents can be forged, but there are likewise appropriate 
verification techniques); see also supra note 55. 
 78. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 801–04; Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 
298–99 (1973) (recognizing that “[t]he hearsay rule . . . has long been recog-
nized and respected by virtually every State”); 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVI-
DENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1365, at 28 (Chadbourn ed. 1974) (de-
scribing hearsay prohibition as the “most characteristic rule of the Anglo-
American law of evidence—a rule which may be esteemed, next to jury trial, 
the greatest contribution of that eminently practical legal system”); David 
Alan Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, 2009 S. CT. REV. 1, 28 (characterizing 
modern hearsay framework as “a strict rule of evidentiary exclusion, accom-
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scholars actively shaped evidence doctrine over the years,80 the 
current hearsay framework exists in spite of, not because of, 
their efforts. In fact, the history of American hearsay rules can 
be characterized as a series of efforts by eminent commentators 
and code drafters to weaken the hearsay prohibition, and the 
prohibition’s surprising resiliency.81
To strengthen the case for an eHearsay exception and fore-
shadow its contours, this Part presents a (very) brief history of 
the American hearsay prohibition, highlighting the recent ef-
forts of would-be hearsay reformers, and the culmination of 
those efforts in a proposed, but ultimately rejected, federal 
hearsay exception for “Statements of Recent Perception.” The 
largely forgotten SRP exception is surprisingly well suited to 
regulating the admission of electronic utterances and could 
serve as a sturdy base from which to craft an alternative to the 
status quo: a new “eHearsay” exception.  
 
A. THE HEARSAY PROHIBITION  
American evidence rules prohibit the introduction of any 
out-of-court statement offered as proof of the “matter asserted” 
by the out-of-court speaker, or “declarant.”82 This “hearsay” 
prohibition applies even to the out-of-court statements of wit-
nesses who testify at trial.83
 
panied by a long and confusing set of exceptions”). 
 Thus, if I post a Facebook status 
update that says, “my boss hit me this morning for being late,” 
 79. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 184 (1970) (Harlan J., concur-
ring) (noting “disagreement among scholars over the value of excluding hear-
say and the trend toward liberalization of the exceptions”); Michael D. 
Cicchini, Dead Again: The Latest Demise of the Confrontation Clause, 80 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1301, 1308 (2011) (lampooning “the Swiss cheese-like rule 
against hearsay with its thirty or so exceptions”); Falknor, supra note 66, at 
43–45 (summarizing views of Wigmore, McCormick, and Professor Edmund M. 
Morgan to support changes to hearsay doctrine); Michael S. Pardo, Testimony, 
82 TUL. L. REV. 119, 148 (2007) (criticizing “the Byzantine structure of the 
[hearsay] rules” and questioning whether “the rule contributes to or detracts 
from just results”); Sklansky, supra note 78, at 20 (describing federal rules’ 
prohibition of hearsay as “a categorical rule riddled with a labyrinthine series 
of exceptions”). 
 80. See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160 (1995) (acknowledging 
the influence of the “academic community” in shaping the Federal Rules of Ev-
idence); Roger C. Park & Michael J. Saks, Evidence Scholarship Reconsidered: 
Results of the Interdisciplinary Turn, 47 B.C. L. REV. 949, 950–51 (2006) (dis-
cussing the “distinguished history” of evidence scholarship in shaping evidence 
law). 
 81. See infra Part II.A. 
 82. FED. R. EVID. 801–02. 
 83. See, e.g. id. at 801(c); VA. R. EVID. 801(c); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1200. 
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a prosecutor cannot later use that update to prove that my 
boss, in fact, hit me. The out-of-court statement is hearsay and 
inadmissible (absent a hearsay exception) even if I testify in 
court. In practice, the prohibition is designed to force the par-
ties to bring the most knowledgeable witnesses to court and re-
ly on their live testimony, rather than written affidavits or se-
cond-hand accounts.84
Modern hearsay law traces its roots to the early 1700s.
 
85 
The English common law exclusion of out-of-court statements 
began to emerge about that time, grounded in the notion that 
“statements used as testimony must be made where the maker 
can be subjected to cross-examination.”86 This justification still 
resonates with the modern conception that an adversary sys-
tem requires live testimony, not out-of-court statements, as its 
inputs.87 Live witnesses testify under oath at a public trial, un-
der the gaze of interested observers, judge, and jury.88 These 
witnesses are subject to cross-examination—the “greatest legal 
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth”—which probes 
for untoward influence by the sponsoring party, or bias and 
other flaws on the part of the witness.89
 
 84. Sklansky, supra note 
 
78, at 11.  
 85. John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A 
View from the Ryder Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1172, 1187 (1996) (not-
ing there are “examples of hearsay appearing in the Old Bailey Sessions Pa-
pers from 1678 into the 1730s”). 
 86. 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 
§ 1364 at 16 (Chadbourn ed. 1974); Jeffrey Bellin, The Incredible Shrinking 
Confrontation Clause, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1865, 1891–92 (2012) (discussing uncer-
tainty regarding hearsay prohibition in English and early American courts); 
Langbein, supra note 85, at 1172 (contending, contrary to Wigmore, that the 
hearsay rule “hardened only in the last decades of the eighteenth century”); 
see also Mirjan Damaška, Of Hearsay and Its Analogues, 76 MINN. L. REV. 
425, 434–39 (1992) (discussing analogues to hearsay prohibition in European 
law). 
 87. MODEL CODE EVID. 218 (1942) (noting that “the hearsay rule is the 
child of the adversary system”); Mueller, supra note 22, at 378 (explaining 
that “[t]he central premise of the hearsay doctrine is that live testimony is 
preferable to remote statements”). 
 88. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973) (noting as one 
of the reasons to exclude hearsay, that “[o]ut-of-court statements . . . are usu-
ally not made under oath or other circumstances that impress the speaker 
with the solemnity of his statements”); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 
242–43 (1895) (professing the value of a live witness so the jury “may look at 
him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which 
he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief”). 
 89. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (quoting 5 JOHN HENRY 
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367 (3d ed. 1940)); Charles T. McCormick, The Turn-
coat Witness: Previous Statements as Substantive Evidence, 25 TEX. L. REV. 
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The necessary corollary to the sentiments expressed above 
is that an adversary process is not so well equipped to ferret 
out spurious out-of-court statements. Out-of-court speakers 
rarely speak under oath and need not fear perjury prosecution 
or even particularly severe moral condemnation for lying. More 
significantly, cross-examination, the critical adversarial tool for 
unearthing hidden flaws, is blunted when the real subject of 
the examination is absent from court.90
The American hearsay prohibition thus stands on firm the-
oretical ground. Yet skeptics persist. As will quickly become 
apparent, reformers traditionally focus on the prohibition’s two 
most dubious facets. First, why does the prohibition apply to 
the out-of-court statements of testifying witnesses who can, in 
fact, be cross-examined? Second, encouraging parties to bring 
live witnesses to trial may be a worthy goal, but the prohibition 
extends to out-of-court statements of declarants who are de-
ceased or otherwise unavailable to testify. Applying the hear-
say prohibition to statements by unavailable witnesses de-
prives juries of evidence that, while imperfect, is often the best 
the circumstances allow. 
 
B. THE MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 
In recent history, the most direct assault on the hearsay 
prohibition came in the 1942 “Model Code of Evidence” promul-
gated by the American Law Institute (ALI). The Model Code 
represented the studied efforts of the era’s evidence luminaries 
to codify the unruly, judge-made evidence law of the time.91 The 
Model Code’s drafters had a second objective as well—to work a 
“radical change[]” in the common law hearsay prohibition.92
 
573, 576 (1947) (asserting that “the major safeguard of the veracity of testi-
mony and its main factor of superiority to out-of-court statements is its subjec-
tion to the test of cross-examination”). 
 The 
drafters derided “the law governing hearsay” as a “conglomera-
tion of inconsistencies” with little thematic purpose, adding 
that “[t]he courts by multiplying exceptions [to the prohibition] 
reveal their conviction that relevant hearsay evidence normally 
has real probative value, and is capable of valuation by a ju-
 90. See Green, 399 U.S. at 158. 
 91. See MODEL CODE EVID., at III, XII (1942) (listing members of ALI 
“Committee on Evidence,” including Learned Hand, Mason Ladd, Charles 
McCormick, and the reporter, Edmund Morgan, and noting that Wigmore 
served as “Chief Consultant”). 
 92. Id. at III, Comment to Rule 503, at 232; id. at 47 (“[I]t is in the chap-
ter on Hearsay that the Code departs most widely from the common law.”). 
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ry.”93
The Model Code’s drafters attempted to transform the 
hearsay prohibition into a rule of necessity. Section 503 of the 
Model Code made hearsay admissible whenever the declarant 
is “unavailable as a witness.”
 
94 The Code also made hearsay 
admissible whenever the declarant was “present and subject to 
cross-examination.”95 As a result, under the Model Code, hear-
say would almost always be admissible, save for circumstances 
where the proponent of a statement could procure the declar-
ant’s live testimony, but declined to do so. In part because of 
this “radical attitude toward hearsay reform,” no state adopted 
the Model Code.96 Some jurisdictions, such as California, 
spurned it with a “vehemence bordering upon anger.”97
C. THE UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 
 
In 1953, evidence scholars again tried to dilute the Ameri-
can hearsay prohibition.98
 
 93. Id. at 223–24 (1942); cf. Edmund M. Morgan, The Hearsay Rule, 12 
WASH. L. REV. 1, 19 (1937) (scorning the exceptions and inconsistencies of the 
hearsay rule). 
 Building from the wreckage of the 
 94. MODEL CODE EVID. 503 (1942). 
 95. Id. at 231–32; Roger Park, A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Re-
form, 86 MICH. L. REV. 51, 52–53 (1987) (describing the Model Code’s ap-
proach to hearsay); see also Gordon Van Kessel, Hearsay Hazards in the Amer-
ican Criminal Trial: An Adversary-Oriented Approach, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 
480 (1998). With respect to the admission of hearsay by an unavailable declar-
ant, the Model Code mirrored older views, including those of Jeremy Bentham. 
See James H. Chadbourn, Bentham and the Hearsay Rule—A Benthamic View 
of Rule 63(4)(c) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 75 HARV. L. REV. 932, 945 
(1962).  
 96. Park, supra note 95, at 53; see Charles W. Quick, Hearsay, Excitement, 
Necessity and the Uniform Rules: A Reappraisal of Rule 63(4), 6 WAYNE L. 
REV. 204, 217 (1960); Sklansky, supra note 78, at 20 (2009) (“The hearsay pro-
visions of the Model Code of Evidence helped ensure that it was never adopted 
anywhere.”) The Code’s sometimes impenetrable syntax also deserves some of 
the blame. See, e.g., MODEL CODE EVID. 306(3), at 513; Charles T. McCormick, 
Some High Lights of the Uniform Evidence Rules, 33 TEX. L. REV. 559, 559–60 
(1955) (attributing rejection of Model Code to perception that it was “over-
radical in its reforms, especially in opening the door too far for the admission 
of hearsay” and that it was “over-academic in its form of expression”). 
 97. Chadbourn, supra note 95, at 945. 
 98. See id. at 946 (recognizing Uniform Rule 63(4)(c) as “a substitute” for 
the Benthamite rejection of the hearsay prohibition proposed by the Model 
Rules); see also 21 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5005 (2d ed. 2005) (opining darkly 
that “[t]he flowers had hardly wilted on the grave of the Model Code when the 
A.B.A. began searching for a new bride to wear the weeds of reform”); Quick, 
supra note 96, 214–15 (contrasting the Uniform Rules’ moderate attempt to 
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Model Code, and in consultation with the Code’s drafters, a re-
constituted committee of prominent jurists and scholars drafted 
the “Uniform Rules of Evidence.”99 Designed in part to soften 
aspects of the Model Code that were “too far-reaching and dras-
tic for present day acceptance,” the Uniform Rules left the tra-
ditional hearsay prohibition intact, but proposed a novel and 
potentially expansive new hearsay exception.100
[A] statement [of an unavailable witness] narrating, describing or ex-
plaining an event or condition which the judge finds was made by the 
declarant at a time when the matter had been recently perceived by 
him and while his recollection was clear, and was made in good faith 
prior to the commencement of the action.
 Awkwardly ti-
tled “Statements Admissible on Grounds of Necessity General-
ly,” Uniform Rule 63(4)(c) excepted from the hearsay prohibi-
tion: 
101
The Commentary to the rule acknowledged that the excep-
tion was “new” but justified it as meeting a “vital need” to “pre-
vent miscarriage of justice resulting from the arbitrary exclu-
sion of evidence which is worthy of consideration, when it is the 
best evidence available.”
 
102 In concert with the Uniform Rules’ 
treatment of out-of-court statements of testifying witnesses as 
non-hearsay,103 Rule 63(4)(c) again promised to substantially 
unravel the American hearsay prohibition.104
 
alter existing hearsay doctrine with the Model Code’s effort to “knock down all 
barriers to the admission of . . . hearsay”). 
 The Uniform 
 99. UNIF. R. EVID. 161–62 (noting that the drafters of the Uniform Rules, 
including Mason Ladd and Charles McCormick, used the Model Code “as a ba-
sis from which to work” and consulted with Professor Morgan and, through 
him, the ALI Committee that drafted the Model Code). 
 100. Id. at 161. The drafters of the Uniform Rules explicitly distanced 
themselves from the Model Code. Id. at 198 cmt. (explaining that their ap-
proach was a “drastic variation from the A.L.I. Model Code”); cf. FED. R. EVID. 
art. VIII advisory committee’s introductory note (noting that the “draftsmen of 
the Uniform Rules chose a . . . more conventional position” than the drafters of 
the Model Code with respect to hearsay); Mason Ladd, Witnesses, 10 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 523, 523 (1956). McCormick characterized the Uniform Rules’ ap-
proach as a “strategic retreat.” Charles T. McCormick, Hearsay, 10 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 620, 624 (1956). 
 101. UNIF. R. EVID. 63(4)(c), at 199–200. 
 102. UNIF. R. EVID. 63(4), at 200 cmt.; McCormick, supra note 100, at 624 
(describing the rule as “an attempt to answer a need which many judges and 
writers have expressed for a wider use of declarations of persons deceased or 
otherwise unavailable”); M.C. Slough, Spontaneous Statements and State of 
Mind, 46 IOWA L. REV. 224, 253–54 (1960) (supporting 63(4)(c)). 
 103. See UNIF. R. EVID. 63(1), at 198 (removing from the hearsay prohibi-
tion any “statement previously made by a person who is present . . . and avail-
able for cross examination”).  
 104. See CAL. LAW REVISION COMM’N, supra note 12, at 459 (describing the 
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Rules, however, “were only slightly more successful than the 
Model Code,” achieving lasting acceptance only in Kansas, the 
home state of the chairman of the Committee that drafted the 
rules.105
D. THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 
 
Evidence reformers tried one last time to liberalize the 
hearsay prohibition in the next, and most successful, effort to 
create a uniform system of American evidence law: the Federal 
Rules of Evidence adopted by Congress in 1975 and shortly 
thereafter in most state jurisdictions.106
A statement, not in response to the instigation of a person engaged in 
investigating, litigating, or settling a claim, which narrates, de-
scribes, or explains an event or condition recently perceived by the 
declarant, made in good faith, not in contemplation of pending or an-
ticipated litigation in which he was interested, and while his recollec-
 While purporting to 
adopt “the approach to hearsay . . . of the common law,” the 
Federal Rules’ drafters included an exception unknown to the 
common law, Rule 804(b)(2), “Statement of Recent Perception.” 
This rule, which borrowed heavily from Uniform Rule 63(4)(c), 
excepted from the hearsay prohibition: 
 
rule as “clearly a new exception of broad scope and of large importance” and 
endorsing its adoption in California; the Commission rejected the suggestion of 
its consultant); Quick, supra note 96, at 215 (forecasting that among the inno-
vations in the Uniform Rules, Rule 63(4)(c), “the most far reaching exception,” 
will “be under especially heavy attack”). 
 105. See 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 98, § 5005 (explaining that 
Kansas enacted the Uniform Rules “pretty much as is,” New Jersey adopted 
them with significant modifications, and Utah adopted them “only to turn 
around in 1983 and adopt a new set of rules based on the Federal Rules of Ev-
idence”); Michael S. Ariens, The Law of Evidence and the Idea of Progress, 25 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 853, 863 & n.47 (1992) (explaining that “the Uniform Rules 
had only slightly more impact” than the Model Code since “only four jurisdic-
tions adopted [versions of] the Uniform Rules”: Kansas, New Jersey, Utah, 
and the Virgin Islands). The Virgin Islands followed Utah in switching to the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, essentially leaving Kansas as the only state with 
the Uniform Rules of Evidence. See Thomas v. People, No. 2010–0087, 2012 
WL 1522263, at *4 n.11 (V.I. May 2, 2012) (noting that in 2010, the Virgin Is-
lands “repealed the local URE and replaced it with the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence”); State v. Simpson, No. 105,182, 2011 WL 4563106, at *6 (Kan. App. 
Sept 30, 2011), review granted (Mar. 9, 2012) (“Our Kansas Rules of Evidence 
came from the 1953 Uniform Rules of Evidence . . . .”); McCormick, supra note 
96, at 560 (“[T]rial judge, Spencer A. Gard of Kansas, was . . . chairman.”). 
 106. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172 n.8 (1974) (referenc-
ing new rules); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Declarations Against Social Interest: 
The (Still) Embarrassingly Neglected Hearsay Exception, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1427, 1445 (1996) (noting “the passage of the Federal Rules of Evidence and 
their subsequent adoption in most states”). 
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tion was clear.107
The proposed rule was approved by the Supreme Court, 
but rejected by Congress.
 
108 The House Judiciary Committee 
explained that it could not endorse this “new and unwarranted 
hearsay exception of great potential breadth” because it “did 
not believe that statements of the type referred to bore suffi-
cient guarantees of trustworthiness.”109 Congress, being the fi-
nal word on the matter, prevailed. Consequently, the Federal 
Rules and, with four exceptions,110 the evidence codes governing 
state jurisdictions (which largely mirror the enacted federal 
rules) contain no provision analogous to the SRP exception. 
Although these evidence codes contain numerous hearsay ex-
ceptions distilled from the common law, including, in many 
cases, an ill-defined “residual” exception intended for use in 
“rare” and “exceptional” circumstances,111
 
 107. PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED 
STATES DISTRICT COURTS AND MAGISTRATES, 46 F.R.D. 161, 377–78 (1969). As 
with the other exceptions in Rule 804, proposed Rule 804(b)(2) only applied if 
the declarant was “unavailable.” Id. After the proposed rule was benched, its 
number was given to the exception for dying declarations. See FED. R. EVID. 
804(b)(2). 
 adherents to the sta-
 108. H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 6 (1973) (explaining rejection of proposed 
Rule 804(b)(2)). 
 109. Id.  
 110. Hawaii and Wisconsin adopted Rule 804(b)(2) verbatim. See HAW. R. 
EVID. § 804(b)(5) (2012); WISC. STAT. § 908.045(2) (2012). Wyoming adopted 
the exception for civil, but not criminal, cases. See WYO. R. EVID. § 804(b)(5) 
(2012). Kansas continued to apply a precursor to Rule 804(b)(2) based on Uni-
form Rule 63(4)(c). See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(d)(3) (2012). New Mexico 
adopted the exception, but later abandoned it. See State v. Ross, 919 P.2d 
1080, 1086 (N.M. 1996). 
 111. Federal Rule of Evidence 807 provides a “residual exception” for hear-
say that possesses “guarantees of trustworthiness” equivalent to those in the 
other enumerated exceptions. FED. R. EVID. 807; cf. Dallas Cnty. v. Commer-
cial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961) (applying analogous 
residual exception prior to Federal Rules); 6 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET 
A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, at T-214–19 (Joseph M. 
McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2011) (identifying twenty-six states with statutory evi-
dence codes that follow the federal model with respect to a residual exception 
and fourteen states that do not). Relying on the rule’s legislative history, 
courts emphasize that the residual exception should “be used only rarely, in 
truly exceptional cases.” United States v. El-Mezain 664 F.3d 467, 498 (5th 
Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United Tech. Corp. v. 
Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009); Parsons v. Honeywell, Inc., 929 
F.2d 901, 907–08 (2d Cir. 1991); Myrna S. Raeder, A Response to Professor 
Swift, 76 MINN. L. REV. 507, 514 & n.23 (1992) (reporting results of survey of 
reported federal cases that found about fourteen cases a year over a fifteen-
year period where the residual exception was successfully invoked, including 
cases where it was relied on as an alternative ground for admission, a rate 
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tus quo have largely turned back modern efforts to liberalize 
hearsay doctrine.112
III.  A NEW HEARSAY EXCEPTION FOR ELECTRONIC 
STATEMENTS OF RECENT PERCEPTION   
 
One explanation for the failure of the Statement of Recent 
Perception (SRP) exception is that the proposed exception came 
a half-century too early.113
This Part sketches the contours of an eSRP exception—
modeled on the original SRP exception—that would admit, over 
a hearsay objection, a broad array of electronic (and even non-
electronic)
 With a few modifications, the excep-
tion provides a robust grounding for a new “eSRP” or 
“eHearsay” exception tailored to the changes in modern com-
munication norms described in Part I. In concert with the in-
creasing prevalence and preservation of electronic utterances, 
this largely forgotten piece of evidence history could open 
American courtrooms to reliable records of electronic communi-
cations and (finally) ease the heavy hand of the American hear-
say prohibition. 
114
 
Professor Raeder found “clearly high given that the exception was intended to 
cover the ‘exceptional’ case”). Even if courts more broadly embraced the excep-
tion, its vague and amorphous nature renders it unsuitable to regulate 
eHearsay. See id. at 516–17 (decrying routine reliance on the residual excep-
tion as permitting “total erosion of the hearsay rule by judicial discretion” and 
resulting in “the worst of all worlds for litigators who must decide which cases 
to try by evaluating the potentially admissible evidence”). 
 statements that are sufficiently reliable to be 
placed before the finder of fact. For reasons outlined in the sub-
sequent text, the proposed exception actually consists of two 
exceptions: one appended to Federal Rule of Evidence 801 
(statements of testifying witnesses), and the other to Federal 
 112. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298–99 (1973); Sklansky, 
supra note 78, at 28; Mueller, supra note 22, at 369 (explaining that the “mod-
ernists” who “proposed simplified rules aimed at admitting more hearsay . . . 
did not prevail, as can be seen in the adoption and spread of the Federal 
Rules, which retain the exclusionary principle and detailed categorical excep-
tions”); Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for 
the United States District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969) (ex-
plaining that the federal hearsay exceptions constitute a “synthesis” of “the 
many exceptions to the hearsay rule developed by the common law”). 
 113. Cf. McCormick, supra note 100, at 631 (expressing hope that “some 
decades hence,” a broader reform to the hearsay prohibition would emerge 
that allows hearsay to be introduced, and permits jurors the “responsibility for 
valuing such evidence only for what it is worth”). 
 114. See infra Part III.F. 
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Rule of Evidence 804 (statements of unavailable declarants).  
Precise language for the proposed exception appears below. 
Italicized text represents additions to the current Federal Rules 
of Evidence. Non-italicized text (including bolded text) is un-
changed from the existing federal rules, but included, where 
necessary, to provide context. 
The proposed rule borrows heavily from the original SRP 
exception, but also modifies that rule to a significant degree. 
Piece-by-piece analysis justifying both the borrowed provisions 
and the new language follows. 
A. THE REQUIREMENT OF THE DECLARANT’S UNAVAILABILITY 
OR PRESENCE AT TRIAL 
 
“the declarant is unavailable as a witness” or “[t]he declarant 
testifies” 
 
The proposed eSRP exception contains two parts. The de-
termination of which part to apply depends on a single varia-
ble: whether the hearsay declarant testifies at trial. If the de-
clarant does not testify, Rule 804(b)(5), the heart of the 
proposal, controls and requires a showing that the declarant is 
“unavailable” as that term is (already) defined in existing Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 804(a). If the declarant testifies, proposed 
Rule 801(d)(1)(D) governs and permits her otherwise qualifying 
Rule 801. . . . Exclusions from Hearsay 
. . . (d) A statement that meets the following conditions is not hearsay: 
(1) The declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination about a prior 
statement, and the statement: . . . (D) would qualify as a Recorded State-
ment of Recent Perception under Rule 804(b)(5) if the declarant were una-
vailable. 
Rule 804. Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay – When the Declar-
ant Is Unavailable as a Witness 
 . . . 
(b) The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay if the de-
clarant is unavailable as a witness:  
. . . 
(5) Recorded Statement of Recent Perception. A recorded communica-
tion that describes or explains an event or condition recently perceived by 
the declarant, but not including: (A) a statement made in contemplation of 
litigation, or to a person who is investigating, litigating, or settling a poten-
tial or existing claim; or (B) an anonymous statement. 
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eSRPs115 to be admitted as substantive evidence (i.e., for the 
truth of the matter asserted in the out-of-court statement).116
The two components of the proposed exception sweep 
broadly. In the spirit of the ALI’s Model Code of Evidence, the 
exception excludes otherwise qualifying out-of-court statements 
in only one circumstance: when the statement was made by a 
declarant who is available to testify at trial, but not called as a 
witness.
 
117 In that circumstance, the exception cannot be in-
voked. The rationale is both familiar and straightforward. The 
eSRP exception applies either: (1) when the necessity for ad-
mitting hearsay is greatest—i.e., when the declarant is una-
vailable (804(b)(5)); or (2) when the justifications for the hear-
say prohibition are weakest—i.e., when the declarant can be 
cross-examined at trial (801(d)(1)(D)). In addition to paralleling 
the broad approach of the Model Code, the structure set forth 
above mirrors the original SRP exception and Uniform Rule 
63(4)(c).118
B. RECORDED STATEMENTS 
 As the drafters of both provisions recognized, state-
ments of recent perception, while valuable to juries in all other 
circumstances, are not preferable to available live testimony 
from the hearsay declarant. 
 
“[a] recorded communication” 
 
A key reliability-enhancing trait of electronic out-of-court 
statements is that they are invariably recorded. Unlike many 
traditional out-of-court statements (e.g., a suspect’s oral confes-
sion to a jailhouse informant), text messages, email, and status 
updates can be shown directly to the jury. Taking advantage of 
 
 115. “eSRPs” is used here as a convenient shorthand for statements that 
meet the requirements of the proposed eSRP hearsay exception. 
 116. See infra Part III.A. 
 117. See supra Part II.B (discussing Model Code’s approach to hearsay 
generally). 
 118. While Uniform Rule 63(4)(c) required the declarant to be “unavaila-
ble,” another Uniform Rule permitted the introduction, over a hearsay objec-
tion, of all prior statements of a testifying witness. UNIF. R. EVID. 63(1). The 
Model Evidence Code also removed prior statements of testifying witnesses 
from the hearsay prohibition. See MODEL CODE EVID. 503(b). The original SRP 
exception, however, does not apply unless the declarant is unavailable. See 
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES 
DISTRICT COURTS AND MAGISTRATES, 46 F.R.D. 161, 377–78 (1969) (providing 
proposed FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) exception for a “statement of recent percep-
tion”). 
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this attribute, the proposed eSRP exception requires qualifying 
statements to be “recorded.”119 This requirement represents a 
novel and important supplement to the original SRP exception, 
while simultaneously circling back to the exception’s obscure 
roots in a nineteenth-century proposal by James Bradley 
Thayer to exempt written statements of deceased witnesses 
from the hearsay prohibition.120
The reliability advantages of recorded out-of-court state-
ments are widely recognized. When an in-court witness relates 
another person’s hearsay statement, a danger arises that the 
in-court witness’s testimony is unreliable. The testifying wit-
ness may mishear, misremember, miscommunicate, or (worst of 
all) manufacture the out-of-court speaker’s statement.
  
121 This 
concern with the in-court witness’s reliability recedes when the 
out-of-court statement was expressed in writing or otherwise 
recorded.122
 
 119. Cf. Lisa Kern Griffin, The Content of Confrontation, 7 DUKE J. CONST. 
L. & PUB. POL’Y 51, 69 (2011) (emphasizing that “verbatim recordings” are 
generally more useful to jurors than oral renditions of disputed statements); 
McCormick, supra note 
 The in-court witness, in fact, becomes superfluous. 
As with a recording of a 911 call, jurors can cut out the mid-
dleman and “hear” the out-of-court statement for themselves. 
89, at 588 (noting the “hazard of error or falsity in re-
porting oral words” and that this hazard “is very much lessened in the case of 
previous written statements”). 
 120. See JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, LEGAL ESSAYS 303–04 n.1 (The Boston 
Book Co. 1908) (reprinting Thayer’s letter to Suffolk County Bar Association 
advocating above-described hearsay exception that would become enacted, af-
ter modification, in 1898); UNIF. R. EVID. 63(4)(c) cmt. (citing 1898 Massachu-
setts statute as general precursor to the rule); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, § 65 
(2009); infra note 149.  
 121. Park, supra note 95, at 71 (noting that “the existence of hearsay ex-
ceptions that manifest a preference for recorded statements suggests concern 
about the danger of misreport and fabrication by the in-court witness”); 
McCormick, supra note 89, at 588 (noting that a generally overlooked hearsay 
danger is the “hazard of error or falsity in the reporting of oral words”). 
 122. Gordon Van Kessel, Hearsay Hazards in the American Criminal Trial: 
An Adversary-Oriented Approach, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 504–05, 531 (1998) 
(emphasizing as a factor in assessing hearsay evidence: “whether the state-
ment was recorded or otherwise verified as actually made by the declarant 
such that the factfinder need not rely solely on the credibility of the in-court 
witness”); Park, supra note 95, at 57, 71–72 (recognizing that “[t]he danger 
that the in-court witness will distort or fabricate a statement is increased by 
the difficulty of detection” and suggesting that hearsay exceptions that “apply 
only to documentary or other recorded hearsay” are supported, in part, on the 
ground that it “is harder to forge a document than to fabricate an oral state-
ment”); cf. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370(5) (2013) (permitting statement explaining 
the receipt of an injury if, inter alia, “[t]he statement was made in writing, 
was electronically recorded, or made to a physician, nurse, paramedic, or to a 
law enforcement official”). 
Bellin_MLR  
2013] eHEARSAY 39 
 
Anything memorialized by mechanical or electronic means 
as the speaker communicates counts as “recorded” for purposes 
of the eSRP exception. This includes email typed on a laptop 
computer, text messages tapped on a cellphone keypad, Face-
book status updates posted at a desktop computer, or tweets 
entered on a smartphone. In fact, the bulk of hearsay that is in-
tended to be captured by the exception—text messages, emails, 
and social media posts—will easily qualify as “recorded.” These 
out-of-court statements are always contemporaneously memo-
rialized by the computer software that enables their exist-
ence.123
Importantly, the exception does not encompass statements 
that are initially unrecorded, even if they are subsequently 
memorialized. Thus, a witness’s oral statement taken down by 
a police officer at a crime scene on a tablet computer would not 
qualify. While the officer’s transcription of the statement is 
“recorded,” the witness’s statement is not, and normal hearsay-
within-hearsay principles apply to exclude the combined state-
ment.
 
124 Relatedly, the eSRP exception, like the “business rec-
ords” exception, requires the proponent to introduce the “rec-
orded communication” itself, as opposed to testimony about the 
communication.125
 
 123. Written statements would also qualify as “recorded” and, as detailed 
below, are potentially admissible under the exception if an unavailable (or tes-
tifying) declarant communicated in writing about a relevant, recently per-
ceived event. See infra note 
 Consequently, if a text message, social media 
124.  
 124. See FED. R. EVID. 805 (requiring each part of a “combined statement” 
to conform to an exception to the hearsay rule). Similarly, if a police officer 
writes down a witness’s excited utterance, the officer’s written report is not 
admissible as an excited utterance because the officer’s written statement de-
scribing the utterance constitutes a second layer of hearsay. See id. If, on the 
other hand, the officer recorded a witness’s oral statement with a digital re-
corder, the statement is “recorded,” satisfying that aspect of the eSRP excep-
tion. The statement would still not fall within the eSRP exception, however, 
due to the exclusion of statements made to investigators. See infra Part III.D. 
 125. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6) (providing exception for “[a] record of” a busi-
ness); United States v. Wells, 262 F.3d 455, 461 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that 
admission of oral testimony about allegedly lost business records was error, 
and noting that “[t]he government has not cited a case in which testimony was 
allowed to suffice as secondary evidence of a business record under Rule 
803(6)”); State v. Johnson, No. A08–1138, 2009 WL 2150671, *4 (Minn. Ct. 
App. July 21, 2009) (“[A] witness may not testify as to the content of business 
records that are not admitted into evidence.”); 5 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN, JONES 
ON EVIDENCE § 33:18 (7th ed. 1992) (explaining that, under the business rec-
ords exception, “the record itself must be introduced” and thus “[i]t would not 
suffice for a witness to testify that he has examined a company’s record and 
then relate from the witness stand what the record said”). 
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post, or email could no longer be recovered (and shown to the 
jury), testimony about its contents could not be admitted under 
the eSRP exception.126
The excerpted text that leads off this section also includes 
a subtle but important deviation from the original SRP excep-
tion. The eSRP exception substitutes the word “communication” 
for “statement.” The intent of this change is to exclude from the 
exception’s scope the small percentage of “statements” that are 
not also “communications.” For example, diary entries, memos-
to-file, draft emails or “notes to self” could constitute “state-
ments,” but not “communications” if the statements, when ut-
tered, were not intended for any audience.
 
127
There are two reasons to limit the exception to “communi-
cations.” First, the presence of an intended audience can create 
an incentive for sincerity.
 Such statements 
would not be admissible under the proposed exception. 
128
 
 126. See, e.g., State v. Espiritu, 176 P.3d 885, 891 (Haw. 2008) (rejecting 
challenge to testimony about deleted text messages allegedly received from 
defendant, which were admissible as statements of a party, stating that “if ev-
idence is hearsay admissible under an exception to the rule against hearsay, 
then testimony about such evidence is admissible”); Funches v. State, No. 
57654, 2012 WL 436635, at *1 (Nev. Feb. 9, 2012) (reviewing challenge to wit-
ness’s “testimony that he received a text message from another witness stating 
that [the defendant] and two other people had ‘jumped’ the victim”). The “Best 
Evidence” rule will sometimes require the same result, although its strictures 
are lenient. FED. R. EVID. 1002, 1004 (requiring an original to prove the con-
tent of any writing, but providing an exception where, absent bad faith, the 
original or a duplicate cannot be obtained). 
 Second, and more important, limit-
ing the eSRP exception’s scope to “communications” decreases 
 127. The definition of hearsay in the Federal Rules of Evidence requires 
that a qualifying utterance be “intended . . . as an assertion.” FED. R. EVID. 
801(a). Thus, there is an argument that statements not intended to communi-
cate anything to another person are not hearsay at all. See Edmund M. Mor-
gan, Hearsay and Non-Hearsay, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1138, 1139 (1935). 
 128. See HERBERT PAUL GRICE, Logic and Conversation, in STUDIES IN THE 
WAY OF WORDS 22, 27 (1989) (theorizing as general assumption of participants 
in a conversation that neither will “say what you believe to be false”); H. Rich-
ard Uviller, Credence, Character, and the Rules of Evidence: Seeing Through 
the Liar’s Tale, 42 DUKE L.J. 776, 792 (1993) (“[P]eople generally tell mostly 
the truth to most people most of the time . . . .”); cf. Charles F. Bond & Bella 
M. DePaulo, Accuracy of Deception Judgments, 10 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. REV. 214, 229, 231 (2006) (describing empirical support for the con-
cept that factfinders can more easily discern the truth of a statement if the 
statement is uttered “in the midst of social interaction”); Imwinkelried, supra 
note 18, at 321 (“In ‘everyday life’ when we receive a letter, we typically take it 
at face value and presume it to be genuine.”). But see Judson F. Falknor, The 
“Hear-Say Rule” as a “See-Do” Rule: Evidence of Conduct, 33 ROCKY MTN. L. 
REV. 133, 136 (1961) (noting that non-assertive conduct is unlikely to suffer 
from hearsay dangers because people rarely lie to themselves). 
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the potential for parties to abuse the exception by introducing 
self-serving out-of-court statements generated for litigation (or 
posterity). Most problematic would be statements that conven-
iently appear during litigation and purport to narrate disputed 
events in a way that benefits the offering party.129 In fact, many 
such statements would already fall outside the exception since 
they are “made in contemplation of litigation.”130
C. DESCRIBING RECENTLY PERCEIVED EVENTS 
 But courts will 
struggle to assess whether something like a diary entry or draft 
email was generated with legal proceedings in mind. Explicitly 
excluding such non-communicative statements from the scope 
of the exception decreases the pressure on judges to smoke out 
fabricated statements that appear to satisfy the literal de-
mands of the exception but suspiciously surface during litiga-
tion, rather than in real time. Conveniently, the primary tar-
gets of the eSRP exception—text messages, email, or social 
media postings (and their present and future analogues)—will 
virtually always satisfy the “communication” requirement. 
 
“that describes or explains an event or condition recently per-
ceived by the declarant” 
 
Uniform Rule 63(4)(c) and the original SRP exception limit 
the subject matter of qualifying statements. A statement that 
falls within the exceptions must “narrate[], describe[], or ex-
plain[] an event or condition recently perceived by the declar-
ant.”131 This limitation primarily serves to exclude statements 
describing events of the more distant past.132
 
 129. See 4 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL 
EVIDENCE § 8:70, at 599 (3d ed. 2007) (discussing similar problem in context of 
statements admitted under Rule 803(3)). 
 The eSRP excep-
 130. See Fischer v. State, 252 S.W.3d 375, 376 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) 
(deeming as inadmissible hearsay a police officer’s “factual observations of a 
DWI suspect, contemporaneously dictated on his patrol-car videotape”); infra 
Part III.D. 
 131. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) (proposed 1979); see also UNIF. R. EVID. 63(4). 
The limitation also excludes opinions and speculation, but such statements 
(whether in or out-of-court) are generally excluded by other rules. See FED. R. 
EVID. 602 (requiring testimony to be based upon “personal knowledge”); FED. 
R. EVID. 701 (providing limitations for testimony that is based upon “opinion”). 
 132. Predictions about future events, general speculation, and opinions (al-
so excluded by this requirement) are already barred by other rules. See FED. 
R. EVID. 602 (requiring testimony to be based on “personal knowledge”); FED. 
R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note (explaining that a hearsay declarant 
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tion maintains this limitation which, as explained below, trans-
lates nicely into the digital age.  
Requiring qualifying statements to be descriptions of “re-
cently perceived” events enhances the reliability of statements 
admitted under the proposed exception, while only marginally 
restricting its scope. In terms of reliability, recorded descrip-
tions of the distant past engender increased concerns about in-
accuracy. Motives for shading or distorting descriptions of past 
events are more likely to arise and solidify with the passage of 
time.133 In addition, memories steadily degrade as the time be-
tween an event and a statement describing that event ex-
pands.134
The reliability gains of the eSRP exception’s subject matter 
limitation come at little cost. The new wave of electronic utter-
ances described in Part I most commonly involves descriptions 
of, or reactions to, recent events. This is a function of the pur-
pose of the new communication tools. Facebook, Twitter, and 
texting services are designed to keep others, including often our 
family and friends, apprised of recent and ongoing occurrenc-
es.
 
135
 
must, like a trial witness, be speaking from personal knowledge). 
 We use these tools—and tolerate their shortcomings—to 
 133. See Bellin, supra note 14, at 340 (describing similar rationale for 
hearsay exception for present sense impression exception); Edmund M. Mor-
gan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. 
REV. 177, 193 (1948) (suggesting that “the opportunity for reconsideration and 
for baneful influence by others” is “more likely to color . . . later testimony 
than [a] prior [out-of-court] statement[]”); see also CAL. LAW REVISION 
COMM’N, supra note 12, at 313 (Comment to Rule 63(1)) (stating that in “many 
cases” a “prior inconsistent statement is more likely to be true than the testi-
mony of the witness at trial because it was made nearer in time to the matter 
to which it relates and is less likely to be influenced by the controversy which 
gave rise to the litigation”). 
 134. Gary L. Wells & Deah S. Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness Identifica-
tion Procedures and the Supreme Court’s Reliability Test in Light of Eyewit-
ness Science: 30 Years Later, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 13 (2009) (“[M]ore 
memory is lost in the first hour than in the second hour, more in the first day 
than the second day, more in the first week than in the second week, and so 
on.”); McCormick, supra note 89, at 577 (discussing scientific findings on 
memory degradation at various intervals, which support intuition that “[t]he 
fresher the memory, the fuller and more accurate it is”). 
 135. See generally About, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/about (last visited 
Oct. 13, 2013) (describing Twitter as “a real-time information network” where 
users can get “up-to-the-second information” regarding “the latest stories, ide-
as, opinions and news about what you find interesting”); About, FACEBOOK, 
http://www.facebook.com/facebook/info (last visited Oct. 13, 2013) (explaining 
that “[m]illions of people use Facebook every day to keep up with friends, up-
load an unlimited number of photos, share links and videos, and learn more 
about the people they meet”). 
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fill relatively short temporal gaps between our current trans-
mission and our last electronic or in-person communication.136
The only real dilemma with respect to the subject matter 
limitation arises in its application. A “recently perceived” limi-
tation raises an obvious line-drawing concern: how recent? 
Case law applying state variants of Uniform Rule 63(4)(c) and 
the original SRP exception provides some guidance. Courts ap-
plying the “recently perceived” language have, with little con-
troversy, extended the gap between event and statement up to 
eight days.
 
Electronic statements can, of course, describe more remote or 
even historic events. However, those that do, like lengthy blog 
posts, word processing documents, or emails summarizing past 
milestones, resemble familiar analogues such as books, letters, 
and diaries. There is little need to tailor the eSRP exception to 
such statements. Existing hearsay exceptions crafted with the-
se traditional forms of communications in mind should suffice. 
137 Longer delays invite more searching scrutiny, but 
do not necessarily require exclusion.138
 
 136. Amanda Lenhart et al., Teens and Mobile Phones, PEW INTERNET & 
AM. LIFE PROJECT 35–37 (Apr. 20, 2010), http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/ 
2010/Teens-and-Mobile-Phones.aspx (reporting that when asked why they 
text, teens’ most common responses were “to just say hello and chat,” “to re-
port where you are or check where someone else is,” and “to coordinate where 
you are physically meeting someone”). 
 Indeed, in one “unusual 
 137. See State v. Berry, 575 P.2d 543, 545 (Kan. 1978) (affirming admission 
of victim’s statement to detectives eight days after shooting); see also State v. 
Peterson, 696 P.2d 387, 395 (Kan. 1985) (affirming admission of statement 
under Kansas variant of Uniform Rule 63(4)(c) where statement was “made on 
the same day or the following day” after the described event); State v. Brown, 
556 P.2d 443, 447 (Kan. 1976) (explaining that the “recently perceived” re-
striction “allows for a considerable passage of time, so long as the statement 
was made at a time when the event could still be reasonably classified as ‘re-
cent’”). But see Ted Finman, Implied Assertions as Hearsay: Some Criticisms of 
the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 14 STAN. L. REV. 682, 707 (1962) (suggesting 
that a statement made “a full week after” the thing perceived would “not qual-
ify as having been made ‘at a time when the matter had been recently per-
ceived’”); CAL. LAW REVISION COMM’N, supra note 12, at 462 (illustrating the 
operation of the temporal limit in the Uniform Rule with a dichotomy of a 
statements describing the cause of injury made “the day after [the] injury,” as 
opposed to “two months later”). 
 138. See Brown, 556 P.2d at 447 (explaining that statement “made three 
days after” event described “could reasonably” meet recently perceived limita-
tion); Staggs v. State, No. 94,271, 2006 WL 1816339 at *1 (Kan. Ct. App. June 
30, 2006) (noting admission of victim’s hearsay statement that was made “sev-
eral days after” beating described in statement); State v. Kreuser, 280 N.W.2d 
270, 273 (Wis. 1979) (rejecting challenge to admission of statement made 
“within a day” after event described); cf. State v. Broyles, 36 P.3d 259, 271 
(Kan. 2001) (rejecting challenge to exclusion of statements offered under the 
exception that were made “some 20 months later” than the described event). 
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case,” an “eight to ten week” delay was permitted because the 
declarant—a victim of an accident—was physically unable to 
make an earlier statement.139
The mere passage of time, while important . . . is not controlling . . . . 
A determination regarding recency of perception depends on the par-
ticular circumstances of the case, including whether there were any 
intervening circumstances, such as injuries, which precluded or lim-
ited an earlier statement.
 The Wisconsin Supreme Court 
explained: 
140
As the preceding excerpt makes clear, the “recently per-
ceived” restriction is principally concerned with suspicious de-
lays in reporting an alleged event (as opposed to fading memo-
ries), and it should be applied in that spirit. Unnatural gaps 
between an event and its description constrict the permissible 
time period under the eSRP exception, while more natural gaps 
due to injuries (or Wi-Fi outages) expand it.
 
141
 
 This flexibility 
will admittedly leave some gray areas for judicial interpreta-
tion, but given the nature of electronic communication, the vast 
majority of utterances in text messages and social media will 
fall comfortably within the exception’s temporal bounds. 
 
D. OUTSIDE THE SHADOW OF LITIGATION 
 
“not including . . . a statement made in contemplation of liti-
gation or to a person who is investigating, litigating, or set-
tling a potential or existing claim” 
 
The eSRP exception—like the original SRP exception and 
Uniform Rule 63(4)(c)—attempts to maximize the reliability of 
qualifying statements and minimize the dangers of abuse by 
excluding from the rule’s scope any statement made in the 
“shadow of litigation.”142
 
 139. Kluever v. Evangelical Reformed Immanuels Congregation, 422 
N.W.2d 874, 875–76 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).  
 The concept is simple and intuitive (if 
 140. Id. at 877. 
 141. Cf. Kreuser, 280 N.W.2d at 273 (discounting delay in making of state-
ment where “delay was occasioned by the fact that” the declarant had to track 
down the telephone number of the recipient). The original SRP exception con-
tained a distinct safeguard of a “clear” recollection to ensure that the declar-
ant’s memory had not degraded, but how trial courts were supposed to apply 
this requirement to absent declarants is unclear, and it is omitted from the 
current proposal. 
 142. See also Thayer, LEGAL ESSAYS, supra note 120, at 303 n.1 (reprinting 
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not “too obvious to require comment”143): the specter of litiga-
tion has a distorting effect, causing some witnesses to deviate 
from honest narration.144 Further, litigation creates powerful 
incentives for parties to attempt to influence witness state-
ments.145
Concerns about the distorting effects of litigation arise 
even before formal legal proceedings are initiated, and so the 
proposed eSRP exception adopts the original SRP exception’s 
broad interpretation of the applicable shadow of litigation. A 
statement will not be admissible as an eSRP if it was elicited 
during an investigation of a legal claim or otherwise “made in 
contemplation of litigation,” even if a suspect had not yet been 
arrested or a lawsuit not yet filed when the statement was 
made. By contrast, the Uniform Rule permitted statements ob-
tained during a pre-litigation investigation so long as legal ac-
tion had not formally “commenc[ed].”
  
146
 
Thayer’s proposal advocating exception to the Massachusetts hearsay rule 
that required statements to be “made in writing ante litem motam,” i.e., before 
the litigation). 
  
 143. See CAL. LAW REVISION COMM’N, supra note 12, at 463 (stating that 
the necessity for the Uniform Rule’s ante litem motam requirement is “too ob-
vious to require comment”). 
 144. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1157 n.9 (2011) (suggesting 
that out-of-court statements that are “made for a purpose other than use in a 
prosecution” are more likely to be trustworthy); CAL. LAW REVISION COMM’N, 
supra note 12, at 313 (Comment to Rule 63(1)) (noting that testimony at trial 
is often less credible than certain out-of-court statements because, among oth-
er things, the statements are “less likely to be influenced by the controversy 
which gave rise to the litigation”). In addition to eliminating an incentive to 
lie, pre-litigation statements are less likely to be planned, making them easier 
for jurors to correctly evaluate. See Bond & DePaulo, supra note 128, at 227 
(conducting meta-analysis of studies about the ability to detect false state-
ments and finding evidence that people “achieve higher lie-truth detection ac-
curacy when judging unplanned rather than planned messages”). 
 145. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1157 n.9 (“Many . . . exceptions to the hear-
say rules . . . rest on the belief that certain statements are, by their nature, 
made for a purpose other than use in a prosecution and therefore should not 
be barred by hearsay prohibitions.”); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 
14 (1948) (highlighting the “often competitive enterprise of ferreting out 
crime”); Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 114 (1943) (finding an employee’s 
injury report inadmissible because the report was “calculated for use . . . in the 
court, not in the business”). 
 146. Compare State v. White, 673 P.2d 1106, 1112 (Kan. 1983) (statements 
to police officers investigating unattended child admissible under Uniform 
Rule), and State v. Berry, 575 P.2d 543, 545 (Kan. 1978) (affirming admission 
of victim’s statements to detective in hospital room eight days after shooting 
under Uniform Rule), with State v. Barela, 643 P.2d 287, 290 (N.M. Ct. App. 
1982) (explaining that because victim’s out-of-court statement was “made at 
the instigation of the officer[,] the [SRP] exception . . . is inapplicable”). Of 
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Given the nature of the electronic communication norm de-
scribed in Part I, the reliability gains obtained by excluding 
statements tainted by the shadow of litigation are, once again, 
fairly costless. Text messages and social media posts are rarely 
generated by investigators’ queries or otherwise created in con-
templation of litigation.147 Those that are, such as an email re-
sponse to a detective’s inquiry about a crime, parallel non-
electronic statements that existing hearsay rules comfortably 
handle.148
 
 
 
E. NO EXPLICIT “GOOD FAITH” REQUIREMENT 
 
“but not . . . an anonymous statement” 
 
Both Uniform Rule 63(4)(c) and the original SRP exception 
apply only to out-of-court statements “made in good faith.” The 
thinking behind this requirement, which can be traced to the 
Thayer-influenced 1898 Massachusetts statute referenced ear-
lier, is understandable.149
 
course, the mere fact that a statement describes something unlawful will not 
render it inadmissible because made “in contemplation of litigation.” As with 
the analysis of “testimonial” under the Confrontation Clause, this requirement 
is intended to exclude statements made with a “primary purpose” of influenc-
ing litigation. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155. 
 In fact, it is hard to argue that any 
 147. For cases considering the contemplation of litigation restriction under 
the SRP exception, see State v. Haili, 79 P.3d 1263, 1277 (Haw. 2003) (reject-
ing the argument that the SRP exception did not apply because the domestic 
violence victim may have been contemplating divorce proceedings); and State 
v. Ross, 919 P.2d 1080, 1086 (N.M. 1996) (rejecting a challenge to admission of 
evidence under the SRP exception where the victim may have been contem-
plating obtaining a restraining order).  
 148. The proposed exception does not adopt the original SRP exception’s 
proviso that only litigation “in which [the declarant] was interested” triggers 
exclusion. Courts will have difficulty determining whether an absent declarant 
has an “interest” in potential litigation, and the inquiry has little utility. See, 
e.g., State v. Ballos, 602 N.W.2d 117, 123 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (concluding, 
somehow, that anonymous callers to 911 “were not involved in or anticipating 
litigation in which they were interested”). 
 149. See supra Part III.B; see also UNIF. R. EVID. 63(4)(c) cmt. (citing 1898 
Massachusetts statute as general precursor to the rule); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 
233, § 65 (2009) (excepting a statement of a decedent in civil cases “if the court 
finds that it was made in good faith and upon the personal knowledge of the 
declarant”); PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS AND MAGISTRATES, 46 F.R.D. 161, 382–84 
(citing the Massachusetts statutes in the advisory committee notes following 
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hearsay statement should be admitted unless it was made in 
good faith. The difficulty is determining precisely what “good 
faith” means in this context and, relatedly, applying the stand-
ard in a coherent and predictable manner. As explained below, 
these difficulties render an explicit “good faith” requirement 
more trouble than it is worth. Consequently, the eSRP excep-
tion takes the different and more common approach of relying 
on predefined attributes of qualifying statements to determine 
reliability (and thus admissibility) in lieu of an amorphous 
“good faith” requirement. 
The experience of the few states that apply variants of the 
SRP exception provides a useful perspective on how a “good 
faith” requirement works in application. The Wisconsin 
courts—which have grappled with this issue more explicitly 
than others—explain that “whether a statement is made in 
‘good faith’ depends on ‘the declarant’s incentive to accurately 
relate the event or condition.’”150 In Wisconsin, this means that 
statements are made in “good faith” if they are communicated 
to others with whom the speaker has some connection, for ex-
ample: a statement made to the declarant’s “girlfriend, who 
was the mother of his son and presumably someone he trusted 
and in whom he confided,”151 statements made to the declar-
ant’s “good friend” and his friend’s son;152 and statements 
“made to people to whom [the declarant] was close.”153
 
proposed FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2)); cf. R.I. R. OF EVID. 804(c) (“A declaration of 
a deceased person shall not be inadmissible in evidence as hearsay if the court 
finds that it was made in good faith before the commencement of the action 
and upon the personal knowledge of the declarant.”); Roger Park, The Hearsay 
Rule and the Stability of Verdicts: A Response to Professor Nesson, 70 MINN. L. 
REV. 1057, 1065 n.32 (1986) (tracing lineage of Uniform Rule to Massachusetts 
statute). Striking a common chord with the eSRP exception, Thayer’s proposal, 
upon which the Massachusetts statute was based, did not include a “good 
faith” requirement and applied solely to written statements. See THAYER, LE-
GAL ESSAYS, supra note 
 Less in-
tuitively, “[b]y their nature, 911 calls are presumably ‘made in 
120, at 303 n.1; Chadbourn, supra note 95, at 942–43 
(discussing same). 
 150. State v. Manuel, 697 N.W.2d 811, 820 (Wis. 2005). 
 151. State v. Manuel, 685 N.W.2d 525, 530 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d, 697 
N.W.2d 811 (Wis. 2005).  
 152. State v. Weed, 666 N.W.2d 485, 492 (Wis. 2003); cf. State v. Maestas, 
584 P.2d 182, 189 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978) (affirming admission of statements 
“made by the victim to [her] sister and sister-in-law”). 
 153. State v. Kutz, 671 N.W.2d 660, 682 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003); cf. State v. 
Burke, 574 A.2d 1217, 1223 (R.I. 1990) (affirming admission of statement 
made “to a blood relative”). 
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good faith’” for purposes of the exception.154 In Kansas, we learn 
that statements made by young children satisfy the require-
ment, since “[i]t is highly doubtful [a] six-year-old would 
make . . . statements except in good faith.”155
This state court case law interpreting the “good faith” re-
quirement demonstrates its weaknesses. In essence, courts ap-
ply the “good faith” requirement by making an intuition-based 
judgment about an out-of-court declarant’s sincerity.
 
156 A wit-
ness’s credibility, however, is typically a jury question, and 
there is little reason to deviate from that default principle 
here.157 Questions about whether an out-of-court speaker would 
lie to a loved one, prevaricate in a 911 call, or make a false 
statement at a young age can be left to the jury, without any 
sacrifice of reliability.158
 
 154. State v. Ballos, 602 N.W.2d 117, 123 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).  
 If the jury determines that the out-of-
 155. State v. White, 673 P.2d 1106, 1112 (Kan. 1983). 
 156. See Manuel, 685 N.W.2d at 530 (affirming finding of “good faith” 
where “[n]othing in the record suggests . . . that [the declarant] lied”); Peter 
Nicolas, ‘I’m Dying to Tell You What Happened’: The Admissibility of Testimo-
nial Dying Declarations Post-Crawford, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487, 532–33 
(2010) (describing function of “good faith” requirement in the “few states” that 
apply it); CAL. LAW REVISION COMM’N, supra note 12, at 463 & n.10 (explain-
ing that “good faith” requirement in Uniform Rule “probably means that the 
judge, acting pro hac vice like a juryman, may simply conclude ‘I do not believe 
his statement’”).  
 157. See FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee’s introductory note, at 
405 (“For a judge to exclude evidence because he does not believe it has been 
described as ‘altogether atypical, extraordinary . . . .’”); Chadbourn, supra note 
95, at 947 (criticizing Uniform Rule’s provision for exclusion of out-of-court 
statement not made in “good faith” as violating the “time-honored formula” 
that “credibility is a matter of fact for the jury, not a matter of law for the 
court”); cf. Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 728 (2012) (“[T]he jury, 
not the judge, traditionally determines the reliability of evidence.”); Kansas v. 
Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 594 n.* (2009) (“Our legal system . . . is built on the 
premise that it is the province of the jury to weigh the credibility of competing 
witnesses . . . .”). 
 158. Cf. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993) (“Vigor-
ous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruc-
tion on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of at-
tacking shaky but admissible evidence.”); FED. R. EVID. 806 (permitting a 
party to impeach the credibility of a hearsay declarant “by any evidence that 
would be admissible for [that] purpose[] if the declarant had testified as a wit-
ness”). That is not to say that juries are particularly adept at this task, just 
that judges would be no better. George Fisher, The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector, 
107 YALE L.J. 575, 707 (1997) (discussing research that shows that “juries 
have no particular talent for spotting lies”); Richard L. Marcus, Completing 
Equity’s Conquest? Reflections on the Future of Trial Under the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 725, 759 (1989) (“[C]urrent psychologi-
cal research provides no basis for believing that assigning the task of evaluat-
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court speaker cannot be trusted, it can discount the statement 
accordingly. 
In lieu of a “good faith” requirement, the proposed eSRP 
exception identifies specific attributes of out-of-court communi-
cations, and particularly electronic communications, that en-
hance reliability.159 This approach places concrete limits on trial 
court discretion and creates a measure of predictability and 
consistency for litigants.160 Ex ante predictability is particularly 
important in modern times, since most cases are resolved in 
advance of trial.161
In assessing the reliability of electronic communications, 
one particular characteristic exudes unreliability: anonymity. 
As noted in a preceding section, accountability helps to ensure 
reliability.
 
162 Anonymous statements avoid accountability by 
design.163
 
ing demeanor to judges would result in significant improvements in deception 
detection.”). 
 The proposed eSRP exception thus excludes “anony-
 159. Cf. Victor J. Gold, Do the Federal Rules of Evidence Matter?, 25 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 909, 920 (1992) (criticizing evidence rules that “utiliz[e] undefined 
terms” and “rather than providing a clear rule regulating admissibility,” rely 
on judicial discretion thus “invit[ing] the judiciary to assume an undisciplined, 
ad hoc approach to applying the Rules”). The Massachusetts statute from 
which the “good faith” requirement is drawn required only unavailability 
(through death) and “good faith.” See supra note 149, a more sensible approach 
than tacking “good faith” onto a handful of specific characteristics. 
 160. Cf. Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 164–65 (1995) (noting that 
the drafters of the Federal Rules consciously rejected a “statement-by-
statement balancing approach” because “[i]t involves considerable judicial dis-
cretion[,] . . . reduces predictability[,] and . . . enhances the difficulties of trial 
preparation”); FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee’s introductory note, 
at 405 (rejecting proposal for “individual treatment [of hearsay] in the setting 
of the particular case” as “involving too great a measure of judicial discretion, 
minimizing the predictability of rulings, [and] enhancing the difficulties of 
prepar[ing] for trial”); Mueller, supra note 22, at 397 (noting in hearsay con-
text that “[p]ractitioners strongly believe they need protection against broad 
judicial discretion”). 
 161. See supra note 73. These same concerns counsel against any attempt 
to broadly filter electronic communications through the residual hearsay ex-
ception in Rule 807. See supra note 111.  
 162. See supra Part III.C; supra note 128. 
 163. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audienc-
es, and Anonymous Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1537, 1559 (2007) 
(“Anonymous speech . . . is, on average, less valuable than nonanonymous 
speech to speech consumers (audiences) who often use speaker identity as an 
indication of a work’s likely truthfulness . . . .”); Edward Stein, Queers Anony-
mous: Lesbians, Gay Men, Free Speech, and Cyberspace, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 159, 193–94 (2003) (discussing arguments against anonymous speech in 
the First Amendment context, including that a “person who contributes to 
public debate anonymously lacks accountability and therefore reliability” and 
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mous” statements, which are quite common in the digital 
world; comments on blog posts, tweets, or texts will only fall 
within the exception if they were made by someone whose iden-
tity is discernible to the communication’s recipients.164 As al-
ready discussed, the proposed exception’s requirement that a 
qualifying statement be a “communication” similarly ensures 
some accountability for insincerity.165 These complementary re-
quirements dictate that any qualifying eSRP has an identifia-
ble sender and an intended recipient, a low hurdle for the vast 
bulk of electronic utterances, and a useful reliability safeguard. 
Other mandates of the eSRP exception, including that the qual-
ifying statements arise outside the shadow of litigation and re-
late to “recently perceived” events, also protect against the ad-
mission of unreliable statements. These requirements, working 
in concert, separate the bulk of facially unreliable from facially 
reliable out-of-court electronic statements. The rest of the work 
can be left to juries, the traditional arbiters of the weight to be 
given to relevant evidence.166
To the extent concerns about deception through “bad-faith” 
electronic utterances remain, other constraints applicable to all 
evidence have a role to play. In particular, authentication re-
  
 
“anonymity creates a greater potential for deception and frivolity”). 
 164. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. State, 273 P.3d 845, 850 (Nev. 2012) (analyzing 
admissibility of text messages sent to assault and robbery victim’s boyfriend 
via victim’s cell phone by then-unknown perpetrators of offense). Anonymous 
communications will also be difficult to admit due to the independent re-
quirement of personal knowledge, although personal knowledge may be ap-
parent “from [the] statement or be inferable from circumstances.” FED. R. 
EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note; see also Booth v. State, 508 A.2d 976, 
984 (Md. 1986) (noting that extrinsic evidence may demonstrate that a state-
ment results from the declarant’s personal perception); Ira P. Robbins, Writ-
ings on the Wall: The Need for an Authorship-Centric Approach to the Authen-
tication of Social-Networking Evidence, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 29–31 
(2012) (cautioning against inferring authorship of electronic communications 
that are insufficiently authenticated); cf. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, 
§ 116(1)(b) (U.K.) (limiting admission of hearsay statements under certain 
provision to circumstances where “the person who made the statement . . . is 
identified to the court’s satisfaction”). 
 165. See supra Part III.C. 
 166. See Margaret Bull Kovera et al., Jurors’ Perceptions of Eyewitness and 
Hearsay Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REV. 703, 704 (1992) (concluding from results 
of empirical analysis of mock juror study that “jurors are, in fact, skeptical of 
hearsay evidence and capable of differentiating between accurate and inaccu-
rate hearsay testimony”); Mueller, supra note 22, at 374 (summarizing argu-
ment that juries can be trusted to weigh hearsay); Weinstein, supra note 20, at 
353 (“There is little reason to believe that jurors . . . are not . . . capable of as-
sessing hearsay’s force without giving it undue weight.”); see also sources cited 
supra note 157. 
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quirements dictate that proponents of electronic evidence offer 
sufficient evidence to support a finding that statements offered 
under the exception are, in fact, actual text messages, tweets, 
or Facebook status updates from the person claimed (i.e., that 
the evidence “is what the proponent claims it is”).167
F. NO EXPLICIT LIMITATION TO “ELECTRONIC” STATEMENTS 
 Finally, 
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 permits courts to exclude cumula-
tive, misleading or unfairly prejudicial evidence of minimal 
probative significance. 
The proposed hearsay exception is intended to provide the 
factfinder with useful information captured in the ubiquitous 
electronic communications chronicled in Part I. It is important 
to recognize, however, that the exception does not require that 
qualifying statements be “electronic.” The twofold reasoning for 
this is explained below. 
First, it is hard to precisely define “electronic” in this con-
text, and likely to become increasingly difficult. There are ad-
mittedly easy cases. Statements typed on computer keyboards 
are electronic, and statements written on paper are not. But 
what about a digital recording of an oral statement, or writing 
with a stylus on an electronic tablet? The line drawing will be-
come increasingly difficult as technology allows people to inter-
face with computers in myriad ways, blurring the distinction 
between oral, written, and “electronic” communication.168
Second, explicitly distinguishing between electronic and 
non-electronic communications would be almost as unhelpful as 
it is challenging. As technology evolves, virtually every type of 
statement will be utterable with, or without, the assistance of 
an electronic device. Assuming all other contextual factors are 
 
 
 167. FED. R. EVID. 901(a); United States v. McGraw, 62 F. App’x. 679, 681 
(7th Cir. 2003) (discussing procedure for proving authenticity of evidence and 
stating that “the court's role is to examine the evidence to determine whether 
the jury could reasonably find the conditional fact by a preponderance of the 
evidence”); State v. Harris, 358 S.W.3d 172, 175 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (“[T]he 
proponent of such evidence [as text messages] must present some proof that 
the message[s] were actually authored by the person who allegedly sent 
them.”); Rodriguez v. State, 273 P.3d 845, 850 (Nev. 2012) (concluding that ten 
text messages were erroneously admitted because not properly authenticated); 
Orenstein, supra note 4, at 202 (discussing authentication and new social me-
dia); Robbins, supra note 164; see supra note 55. 
 168. See Claire Cain Miller, Joining the Party, Not Crashing It: Google 
Aims for Less Intrusive Ways to Fit into Daily Life, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2012, 
at B1 (discussing technological innovations, such as Siri and Kinect, that allow 
people to interface with computers through voice and gestures). 
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equal, it is difficult to articulate any inherent reliability ad-
vantage based on the medium used to express the same record-
ed message. As the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
recognize, it is not the medium itself, but how the medium is 
used that informs the reliability of a resulting statement.169
Taking the preceding points together, it appears that any 
effort to limit the proposed exception to “electronic” communi-
cations would be both unruly and unhelpful. Thus, the pro-
posed rule follows the lead of traditional hearsay rules (as well 
as Uniform Rule 63(4)(c) and the original SRP exception) by not 
limiting its application to any particular medium of communi-
cation. The bulk of statements likely to be admitted under the 
proposed rule will fall within some colloquial definition of “elec-
tronic,” but that does not mean that the rule itself must be lim-
ited to such statements.  
 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS OF AN “eHEARSAY” EXCEPTION   
The preceding sections articulate the justifications for, and 
the precise contours of, the proposed “eHearsay” or “eSRP” ex-
ception to the American hearsay prohibition. This Part discuss-
es the likely implications of adopting the exception. In particu-
lar, it examines the types of statements that, while excluded 
under existing evidence doctrine, will be admitted by the new 
rule. There are three broad categories of such statements: (1) 
eSRPs of testifying witnesses, (2) eSRPs of unavailable victims, 
and (3) eSRPs of unavailable third-party witnesses and accom-
plices.170
 
 169. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 101(b)(6) (“[A] reference to any kind of written 
material or any other medium includes electronically stored information.”); id. 
at 803(6) advisory committee’s note (stating that use of term “data compila-
tion” in business records exception was intended to cover “any means of stor-
ing information other than the conventional words and figures in written or 
documentary form,” including “electronic computer storage”). By contrast, au-
thentication rules vary more naturally across mediums. See id. at 901 (illus-
trating various means of authenticating evidence). 
 Each category is discussed below. 
 170. Another potential category, eSRPs of a non-testifying criminal defend-
ant, is likely precluded by FED. R. EVID. 804(a)’s proviso that the rule’s una-
vailability requirement is not satisfied “if the statement’s proponent procured 
or wrongfully caused the declarant’s unavailability as a witness in order to 
prevent the declarant from . . . testifying.” FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(5); see United 
States v. Bollin, 264 F.3d 391, 413 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that defendant who 
invokes Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify could not invoke Rule 804, 
because he “made himself unavailable for the purpose of preventing his testi-
mony”); United States v. Peterson, 100 F.3d 7, 13 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that 
a person who invokes Fifth Amendment privilege “is considered to be unavail-
able to others for purposes of Rule 804”); Commonwealth v. Labelle, 856 
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Out-of-court statements made by a testifying witness com-
prise the first category of eSRPs that would routinely be admit-
ted under the exception. A recent bribery trial illustrates how 
eSRPs might be used in this context. In United States v. Black-
ett, a witness’s testimony that she was bribed while serving as 
a juror was supplemented with the following text message that 
she sent to her sister after the alleged bribe attempt: 
You see why I tell you I ain’t want to be no damn juror. Some dude 
just come by my house and tell me he going pay me money to say not 
guilty.171
Under existing law, the text—erroneously admitted as a 
“recorded recollection”—should not have been admitted over 
the defendant’s hearsay objection. (The best the appellate court 
could say for the ruling was that it was “harmless.”)
 
172 But un-
der the proposed eSRP exception, the text would be admissible 
without doing any violence to other hearsay exceptions (or 
harmless error principles), providing the jury with valuable in-
formation about the charged crime. An even more compelling 
example comes from People v. Lewis, where a prosecutor intro-
duced “enlarged photocopies” of text messages from a sexual 
assault victim.173
 
N.E.2d 876, 879 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (following “the view proffered by several 
of the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal that a defendant cannot create[ ] his 
own unavailability by invoking his [F]ifth [A]mendment privilege against self-
incrimination”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 The prosecutor relied on the messages (which 
sought help from friends in dealing with a “guy . . . in my 
apartme[n]t” who was “trying to be all o[ve]r me”), and a ques-
 171. United States v. Blackett, No. 11-1556, 2012 WL 1925540 (3d Cir. 
May 29, 2012); Brief for the Appellee at 8–9, United States v. Blackett, 481 F. 
App’x 741 (2012) (No. 11-1556), 2012 WL 1925540, at *3 (providing text of dis-
puted text message). 
 172. Blackett, 2012 WL 1925540, at *742. The text should not have been 
admitted as a recorded recollection since the witness did not have any difficul-
ty remembering the bribery attempt. Brief for the Appellee, supra note 171, at 
2; see also FED. R. EVID. 803(5) (requiring statement to concern a matter the 
declarant “now cannot recall”); Brief of Appellant Ikim Elijah Blackett at 14–
15, United States v. Blackett, 481 F. App’x 741 (2012) (No. 11-1556), 2011 WL 
6935515 (stating defendant’s argument to this effect). The Third Circuit punt-
ed the question of admissibility, concluding only that the text’s admission “was 
harmless.” Blackett, 2012 WL 1925540, at *742. The defendant was likely 
nonplussed as even the prosecution had not claimed that the ruling could be 
upheld on that ground. Brief for the Appellee, supra note 171. Additional fac-
tual development might have revealed that the text was a present sense im-
pression, but that exception was not cited by either party or the appellate 
court. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1) (describing present sense impression exception 
to the hearsay rule). 
 173. People v. Lewis, No. 1-10-3576, 2012 WL 6861248, at *3 (Ill. App. Ct. 
Dec. 28, 2012). 
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tionable hearsay ruling, to rebut the defense’s contention that 
the victim fabricated her testimony about the assault.174
Although perhaps not as valuable to juries as eSRPs of ab-
sent declarants, eSRPs of testifying witnesses will often consti-
tute compelling evidence. If the eSRP is consistent with the 
witness’s testimony, as in Blackett and Lewis, it will flesh out 
that testimony and make it more credible.
  
175 The jury will see 
what the witness said about the event, exactly as she said it, 
during the time period when the event was freshest in her 
mind. It is hard to justify a system that would keep text mes-
sages like those described above from a jury, and by clearly 
permitting such evidence, the proposed exception improves cur-
rent doctrine.176 In addition, by providing a clear conduit for 
admissibility, the eSRP exception reduces the pressure to dis-
tort existing rules (as occurred in Blackett and Lewis) to admit 
this compelling form of proof.177
 
 174. See id. at *3–4, *12. The trial court admitted the statements over a 
hearsay objection solely to show the victim’s “state of mind.” Id. at *3. But in 
response to a defense contention that the lengthy text exchanges admitted at 
trial went well beyond that limited purpose, the appellate court deemed the 
messages admissible for all purposes as prior consistent statements. The court 
ruled that while such prior statements are “[g]enerally . . . inadmissible,” de-
fense counsel’s claim in the opening statement that the victim fabricated her 
account to explain the defendant’s presence “in her bed” could be answered by 
the text messages, which were uttered (just) prior to the defendant’s appear-
ance in that location. Id. at *11–12. 
 
 175. McCormick, supra note 100, at 622 (noting that “[a]n early written 
statement may often give needed and legitimate corroboration to the witness’s 
testimony, where though his veracity has not been challenged, his testimony is 
met by contrary evidence”); see, e.g., Tucker v. Clarke, No. 0037-12-4, 2012 WL 
2886713, at *3 (Va. Ct. App. July 17, 2012) (affirming trial court exclusion of 
emails sent by mother to third party as hearsay, where email was offered by 
mother, who testified in custody proceeding, to corroborate her explanation of 
why she acted out in child’s classroom). 
 176. Cf. UNIF. R. EVID. 63(1), cmt., (1953) (asserting that “[w]hen senti-
ment is laid aside there is little basis for objection” to introduction of a testify-
ing witness’s out-of-court statements as substantive evidence); Edmund M. 
Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 
HARV. L. REV. 177, 192 (1948) (expressing similar sentiment). 
 177. See supra notes 172, 174; see also Abdelrahim v. Guardsmark, No. 
B207270, 2009 WL 3823283, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2009) (affirming tri-
al court ruling admitting email as non-hearsay, and ruling that it was admis-
sible solely to show that an email “was sent” or, alternatively, as a business 
record and, in any event, its admission was harmless); Funches v. State, No. 
57654, 2012 WL 436635, at *1–2 (Nev. Feb. 9, 2012) (concluding that “the dis-
trict court erred by admitting, under the present-sense-impression hearsay 
exception, a witness’s text messages regarding earlier events” because “[t]he 
text messages . . . were written . . . shortly after she woke up” and “involved 
events that occurred before she went to sleep approximately one to two hours 
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An eSRP that is inconsistent with the declarant’s live tes-
timony will be even more valuable to juries and, indeed, is al-
ready admissible for the non-hearsay purpose of impeach-
ment.178 Under current doctrine, when a testifying witness’s 
inconsistent hearsay statement is introduced, the court in-
structs the jury (upon request of a party) that the out-of-court 
statement is admissible not for assessing the truth of the mat-
ter asserted (i.e., not as “substantive” evidence), but only to 
show that the witness said different things at different times 
and, consequently, may not be credible.179 The practice of in-
structing juries on this nuanced distinction between impeach-
ment and substantive evidence is widely ridiculed.180 Consistent 
with a now-pending rules amendment for past consistent 
statements offered to rehabilitate a witness,181
 
earlier” but suggesting that the messages “were admissible under the excited 
utterance exception” (despite the intervening period of sleep!) and, in any 
event, were harmless); Robinson v. State, No. 05–10–01022–CR, 2012 WL 
130616, at *3 (Tex. App. Jan. 18, 2012) (declining to decide whether email 
from testifying witness attaching cell phone picture of suspect, and identifying 
the suspect—“im not sure if they are good enough pics but this is tyrone”—
constituted hearsay, but deeming its admission harmless). 
 the eSRP excep-
tion abandons the (likely futile) effort, and allows jurors to con-
 178. See FED. R. EVID. 613 (discussing procedures for impeaching witnesses 
with prior statements). If the declarant testifies but cannot recall the incident 
described in the eSRP, the eSRP could, under existing doctrine, be used to re-
fresh the declarant’s memory, id. at 612, and if necessary, be introduced as a 
“recorded recollection,” id. at 803(5); see also 4 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & 
LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 8:19, at 116, § 8:35, at 304 (3d 
ed. 2007) (noting that such hearsay statements “are still admissible for im-
peachment purposes” and citing cases). 
 179. See, e.g., United States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 517 F.3d 751, 763 (5th 
Cir. 2008) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing 
extrinsic evidence in to impeach witness’s inconsistent statements); cf. FED. 
R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) (permitting small subset of prior inconsistent statements 
to be introduced as substantive evidence). 
 180. See McCormick, supra note 96, at 562 (characterizing proposal in Uni-
form Rules to allow “prior consistent or inconsistent statements of a witness as 
substantive evidence of the facts” as “well justified” in part because it “avoids 
the empty ritual of instructing the jury not to consider the statement as sub-
stantive evidence”); Morgan, supra note 176, at 193 (describing instruction to 
jury to consider prior statements solely for impeachment as “indulging in a 
pious fraud”). 
 181. See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE, 
BANKRUPTCY, AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVI-
DENCE 214 (Preliminary Draft 2012), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
uscourts/rules/rules-published-comment.pdf (proposing to amend Rule 
801(d)(1)(B) to permit prior consistent statements offered to rehabilitate wit-
ness’s credibility to be used as substantive evidence due to doubt that jurors 
can follow limiting instruction). 
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sider eSRPs of testifying witnesses as substantive evidence.182 
While scholars and policymakers have raised thoughtful objec-
tions to eliminating hearsay treatment of a testifying witness’s 
out-of-court statements, none of those objections apply with any 
force to the types of statements that are admissible as eSRPs.183
The second important category of statements that would 
become admissible as eSRPs consists of electronic utterances of 
victims who are “unavailable” to testify at trial. In fact, eSRPs 
could potentially play a critical role in domestic violence and 
sexual abuse prosecutions, where a victim’s status update, 
online chat, or text messages to friends about abuse will be 
admissible even if the victim refuses to testify, invokes a privi-
lege, cannot be located, or is deceased at trial. A representative 
example is a murder victim’s text message (stating that she 
and the defendant were “fighting”) offered by the prosecution in 
State v. Damper to establish the defendant’s motive.
 
184 People v. 
Logan provides another example.185 In that case, a trial court 
erroneously admitted text messages sent by a deceased victim 
“hours before [her] shooting” which the prosecution used to 
demonstrate that the killing by her ex-boyfriend was premedi-
tated.186
 
 182. See supra Part III.A. 
 There are unfortunately countless other examples, in-
 183. The objection raised by the Federal Rules Advisory Committee was 
the potential for “the general use of prior prepared statements as substantive 
evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee’s note; cf. CAL. LAW REVISION 
COMM’N, supra note 12, at 313 (articulating same objection). Roger Park adds 
that Congress feared that permitting substantive use of prior inconsistent 
statements would incentivize untoward pretrial interrogation. Park, supra 
note 95, at 78–79. Since the eSRP exception excludes statements made to in-
vestigators or otherwise “in contemplation of litigation,” both of these concerns 
drop away. Judson Falknor’s concern that prior inconsistent statements might 
be fabricated if they could be used substantively is mitigated by the precise fix 
Falknor proposed: requiring proof that the prior statement was made (here, in 
the form of a recording of the statement). Falknor, supra note 66, at 53–54. 
 184. State v. Damper, 225 P.3d 1148, 1150, 1152 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (re-
jecting challenge to trial court’s admission of text—“Can you come over? Me 
and Marcus are fighting and I have no gas”—as follows: “we cannot conclude 
the superior court abused its discretion in ruling the text message constituted 
a present-sense impression”); see Bellin, supra note 14, at 344–45 (arguing 
that present sense impression exception was never intended to apply to cir-
cumstances like Damper where the out-of-court statement is presented with-
out any corroborating witness); cf. Gulley v. State, 2012 Ark. 368, at 12 (2012) 
(recounting circuit court ruling admitting defendant’s texts but excluding 
murdered victim’s texts in response as hearsay). 
 185. People v. Logan, No. 303269, 2012 WL 3194222, at *2–3, *6 (Mich. Ct. 
App. Aug. 7, 2012). 
 186. The Court does not specify the content of the text messages, but sum-
marizes that they “indicated that [the] defendant sought to cause ‘conflict’ or ‘a 
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cluding many of the tweets, texts, and related communications 
referenced in the introduction to this Article.187 In fact, the pro-
posed eSRP exception resonates with a prominent commenta-
tor’s proposal that state legislators enact the original SRP ex-
ception to counteract recently stiffened Confrontation Clause 
restrictions on the admission of hearsay statements by victims 
of violent crime.188
The third important category of admissible eSRPs consists 
of communications of uncooperative witnesses. When witnesses 
refuse to testify, invoke a privilege, or cannot be brought to tri-
al, their candid statements on social media and in email and 
text messages could fill the evidentiary void. One can readily 
imagine criminal defendants’ friends and associates, as well as 
uninvolved bystanders, unwittingly generating an electronic 
archive of statements regarding later-litigated events.
 
189
 
problem’ for the victim because he was upset about losing her.” Id. at *6. In a 
familiar pattern, the appeals court noted that the “text messages were hearsay 
to which no exception applied” and thus erroneously admitted, but deemed 
their admission harmless error. Id. 
 A re-
 187. See, e.g., State v. Petersen, No. 12–1114, 2013 WL 2370717, at *2 (Io-
wa Ct. App. May 30, 2013) (relying on residual exception to reject hearsay 
challenge to admission of victim’s text message to sister recounting husband’s 
threats); State v. Ford, 778 N.W.2d 473, 482 (Neb. 2010) (rejecting, on proce-
dural grounds, challenge to trial court ruling admitting the following text 
message in rape prosecution: “I just got raped . . By jake . . I dont know what 
to do . .”); Martin Fricker & Danny Buckland, Great Ormond St Doc Is Sus-
pended Over Abuse Claim, MIRROR, Apr. 7, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 
6692242 (describing evidence against prominent heart surgeon accused of 
child abuse that includes “text messages and voice recordings between two 
witnesses”); John Hult, Man Accused of Tying Up, Beating Woman, ARGUS 
LEADER, Feb. 23, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 3565811 (reporting statement 
of Minnesota prosecutor that “[v]ictims might send text messages or emails 
describing violent incidents but change their story and decline to testify after 
an arrest is made” in which case “electronic messages are considered hearsay 
and are inadmissible in court”); Beth Hundsdorfer, Sheri Coleman Told 
Friends About Marital Problems, BELLEVILLE NEWS-DEMOCRAT, Apr. 29, 
2011, available at 2011 WLNR 8360616 (describing prosecution’s effort to in-
troduce text messages from deceased victim to friends stating that, among 
other things, “her husband beat her”); Michelle R. Smith, Odin Lloyd Texts 
Key Evidence in Aaron Hernandez Murder Charge, WASH. TIMES, June 27, 
2013, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jun/27/odin-lloyd-texts 
-evidence-aaron-hernandez-murder/?page=all (highlighting text message from 
alleged murder victim stating that he was with “NFL” shortly before death); 
cf. McCormick, supra note 100, at 624 (noting that Uniform Rule 63(4)(c) 
would “open the door to statements by victims of crime”). 
 188. See Tom Lininger, Reconceptualizing Confrontation After Davis, 85 
TEX. L. REV. 271, 320–21 & n.274 (2006). 
 189. See, e.g., State v. Cassano, No. 97228, 2012 WL 2580750, at *5 (Ohio 
Ct. App. July 5, 2012) (noting that “[a] major portion of the state’s case con-
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cent Nevada battery trial illustrates a typical scenario. In 
Funches v. State, the trial court (erroneously) admitted testi-
mony regarding a text message sent to the defendant’s brother 
informing the brother that the defendant and two other people 
had “jumped” the victim.190 In another example, a student 
texted his mother after a 2010 school shooting that “there was 
a boy who had his hand in his pocket, and when he pulled it out 
he shot this other boy in the head in the ninth-grade hall.”191 
These types of text messages, while likely inadmissible under 
current hearsay rules, would fit under the eSRP exception, 
even if the sender of the message refused to testify, invoked a 
privilege, or could not be located at trial. The rule will also aid 
criminal defendants with claims of innocence grounded in the 
guilt of a third party. If a defendant claims that another person 
committed the charged crime, or could provide exculpatory tes-
timony, the third party’s relevant electronic utterances can be 
admitted as eSRPs even if the third party raises (as is common 
in such circumstances) a Fifth Amendment privilege or is oth-
erwise unavailable to testify.192
 
sisted of the text messages sent from [an alleged accomplice’s] telephone on 
the night of the robbery”); Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996, 1002, 1006 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2011) (holding that trial court erred in admitting text messages 
sent from the defendant’s phone that indicated the sender’s “intent to deliver 
controlled substances” because statements were hearsay and, since defendant 
could not be identified as sender, not statements of a party); Sorry, Wrong 
Number! Drug-Sale Text Message Goes to Police Instead, CBS CONN. (Jan. 23, 
2012, 3:51 PM), http://connecticut.cbslocal.com/2012/01/23/sorry-wrong 
-number-drug-sale-text-message-goes-to-police-instead (describing drug arrest 
initiated by text message advertising illicit drugs for sale mistakenly sent to 
police officer, and noting that the investigation was ongoing with police seek-
ing the source of the drugs). 
 
 190. Funches v. State, No. 57654, 2012 WL 436635, at *1 (Nev. Feb. 9, 
2012). In Funches, the Nevada Supreme Court recognized that no existing 
hearsay exception permitted the testimony about the text message, but in a 
familiar pattern, deemed the error “harmless.” Id. In the same opinion, the 
Nevada Supreme Court also recognized that the trial court erred in admitting 
“a witness’s text messages regarding earlier events” as present sense impres-
sions, but deemed that error harmless as well. Id. 
 191. Teen Shot at Ala. Middle School Dies; Student Held, DAILY RECORD, 
Feb. 6, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 2539972. 
 192. See, e.g., United States v. Whiteford, 676 F.3d 348, 363 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(explaining legal doctrine governing strict standard for conferring immunity 
on a defense witness against prosecution’s will); United States v. Hardrich, 
707 F.2d 992, 993–94 (8th Cir. 1983) (describing scenario where defendant’s 
effort to introduce exculpatory testimony was frustrated by witness’s invoca-
tion of Fifth Amendment privilege); cf. United States v. Meregildo, 920 F. 
Supp. 2d 434, 438–39 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (evaluating government’s Brady obliga-
tions to turn over informant’s Facebook account containing potentially excul-
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Finally, since many of the examples noted above arise in 
criminal cases, it is worth emphasizing that the admission of 
eSRPs is fully consistent with the Confrontation Clause, a con-
stitutional provision whose mandate to exclude certain 
unconfronted hearsay trumps the hearsay exceptions.193 The 
Supreme Court recently revised its Confrontation Clause juris-
prudence so that the Clause applies only to the admission of 
“testimonial” hearsay.194 Testimonial hearsay, the Court ex-
plains, consists of statements “procured with a primary purpose 
of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.”195 By 
definition, eSRPs cannot be procured or uttered “in contempla-
tion of litigation.”196
The inapplicability of the Confrontation Clause to eSRPs is 
particularly salient because resistance to liberalization of the 
hearsay rule is sometimes justified on the ground that easing 
hearsay restrictions will create a chasm between civil and crim-
inal evidence rules.
 Consequently, they will always be 
“nontestimonial” and admissible under the Confrontation 
Clause even if offered by the prosecution in a criminal case. 
197 The chasm forms, in theory, because the 
Sixth Amendment guarantee of confrontation in “all criminal 
prosecutions”198 counteracts any loosening of the hearsay prohi-
bition in criminal, but not civil, trials.199
  
 These concerns are ab-
sent with respect to the eSRP exception due to the above-
described confluence of the requirements of the proposed excep-
tion with the Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause jurispru 
 
patory posts, but ultimately rejecting claim, in part because defendant had al-
ready obtained access to the account through a private investigator); State v. 
Riggins, No. 1CA–CR09–0311, 2010 WL 5545203, at *12 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 
28, 2010) (ruling that had defendant argued it, trial court’s erroneous exclu-
sion as hearsay of text messages that supported defendant’s self-defense claim 
would be found harmless). 
 193. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him 
. . . .”); cf. Bellin, supra note 28, at 40–42 (discussing nontestimonial electronic 
statements, stating that they do not trigger the Confrontation Clause). 
 194. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61–62 (2004). 
 195. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011). 
 196. See supra Part III.D. 
 197. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee’s introductory 
note, at 405 (pointing to the “split between civil and criminal evidence” that 
would arise, due to the application of the Confrontation Clause, as a reason to 
maintain the hearsay prohibition); Sklansky, supra note 78. 
 198. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 199. FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee’s introductory note, at 405. 
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dence.200
  CONCLUSION   
 Consequently, the proposal should please both evi-
dence realists and purists; eSRPs will be fully admissible even 
in criminal prosecutions, and the evidence rules will continue 
to apply with substantial uniformity in civil and criminal litiga-
tion. 
As a result of technological innovations and changing social 
norms, an unparalleled wealth of recorded, out-of-court state-
ments resides on computers and mobile electronic devices, wait-
ing to assist the finder of fact. Often uttered to family and 
friends outside the shadow of litigation, and preserved in their 
original form, these statements could prove invaluable to ju-
ries. Unfortunately, this compelling evidence will often be in-
admissible due to hearsay rules crafted in an era when elec-
tronic communication was unknown. 
Since the hearsay rules are tools of our own making, the 
most direct response to the recent shift in communication 
norms is to craft a new hearsay exception tailored to the unique 
attributes of electronic communication. Such an exception 
would decrease uncertainty, discourage contortions of existing 
hearsay rules, and most importantly, give juries access to a 
cornucopia of useful information. The exception should also 
strive to screen out the subset of electronic evidence, such as 
anonymous statements and statements made in contemplation 
of litigation, that is most susceptible to fabrication and abuse.  
The daunting task of crafting an “eHearsay” rule is consid-
erably eased by the efforts of a previous generation of evidence 
scholars, who proposed the ultimately unsuccessful “Statement 
of Recent Perception” hearsay exception with the Federal Rules 
of Evidence in 1969. That exception provides a solid base upon 
which to build a new exception tailored to the attributes of 
modern electronic communication. An eHearsay exception will 
allow jurors to see precisely what observers of disputed events 
were saying about those events while the events were fresh, 
and prior to the distorting (and often silencing) effects of litiga-
tion. Jurors, well aware of the electronic communications that 
populate their own lives, will increasingly expect access to this 
 
 200. See Lininger, supra note 188, at 320–21 & n.274 (“The [SRP] exception 
seems particularly well-suited for the Supreme Court’s new confrontation ju-
risprudence because the rule explicitly bars statements when the declarant 
was contemplating litigation or when the declarant was responding to investi-
gators.”). 
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electronic “paper trail.” With a proper framework in place, 
there is no reason to keep it from them. 
 
 
